Erin McCandless
​Conflict and Resilience Monitor, ACCORD
Original post

Violent extremism is often a symptom of state fragility and weak social cohesion. It tends to take root in marginalised areas where the state is not adequately attending to community needs and grievances, which are then easily mobilised. Young people with little hope for their future are particularly vulnerable. While governments tend to pursue ‘hard security’ responses in such contexts, there is a growing awareness that this will not solve the issues. The causes of violent extremism are complex and multifaceted – stemming from a mix of historical, political, economic and social, and psychological push and pull factors, including grievances around economic and political exclusion on the one hand, and ideology and material benefits that transform grievances into violent extremist action, on the other. 

The alarming conclusions of US military intervention in Afghanistan, where an estimated $2.26 trillion was spent to dismantle and defeat the Taliban reveals the limitations of a security driven approach. What if that money had instead gone into improving public services and local governance capacity? Research by UNDP on recruits to violent extremist groups in Africa reveals that they strongly believe that governments only look after the interests of the few (83% of respondents), and that they have little trust in politicians or law enforcement (75% of respondents). These views indicate weak state capacity to carry out basic functions, manage risk and develop trusted relationships with society. 

The uprising in Cabo Delgado has roots in both a rising Islamist presence in the region, and predictable grievances about economic marginalisation, lack of jobs, security sector and human rights abuses, adverse livelihood impacts and not receiving the benefits associated with the region’s vast mineral resources – notably rubies and gas. Despite this wealth, Cabo Delgado is the region poorest in human development, wielding a huge illicit economy including gems, wildlife, drugs and human smuggling. The involvement of local officials creates distrust amongst the population and undermines the state’s capacity to tackle the issues in the region. The state’s weak administrative reach and security presence allowed the insurgency to take root. Decentralisation, despite policy agreement, is sluggish and politicised, compounded by the lack of community voices and participation. Mozambique’s steadily rising fragility score backs up this analysis (the 80thmost fragile country in 2006 by FSI rankings, today it is 22nd of 179 countries). The worst scores are uneven development (where Mozambique scores 9.2 out of a high fragility score of 10) and public services (9.9 out of 10). 

Lively debates have occurred around the nature of external intervention in Cabo Delgado, though there is little disagreement on the need for assistance to stem insurgent advances given the weaknesses of Mozambique’s security sector. The government’s invitation to Rwanda, outside of its Southern African Development Community (SADC) home, drew criticism and questioning. Rwanda’s achievements on the ground are proving fruitful. As ICG has argued, military assistance must be targeted, avoiding the heavy external deployments that might fuel complexity and intractability, and law enforcement in the region to counter jihadist expansion is paramount. 
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Considering that much more is needed to achieve peace and sustain it than silencing guns – what more is required? The United Nations (UN’s) sustaining peace agenda – backed by twin 2016 Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, suggests that sustaining peace is a goal and a process to “build a common vision of society,” with activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of conflict moving towards recovery and development – in a holistic manner and with a focus on addressing root causes. Applying this lens to Cabo Delgado shifts attention to the development of nationally and locally owned visions and policy action to address structural causes. 

A social contract framing which targets contexts of conflict and fragility is helpful in this instance. Prior research would suggest that in Cabo Delgado this means: i) tying a political solution to agreements around inclusive, participatorily developed, and nationally-owned policies, ii) building responsive institutions that reflect local needs and radically improve service delivery, iii) improving social cohesion vertically and horizontally by tackling the resentment and mistrust of the state that paves the way for terrorist narratives to gain a foothold, and, the inter-communal cleavages caused by struggles for resources and internal displacements (horizontal). Positive communications strategies as part of wider behaviour change efforts are key, escalating respected local voices that can displace insurgent narratives. Local disengagement and reconciliation processes that build new avenues to cultivate a sense of belonging are also vital.

​Advancing political and economic inclusion is a cross-cutting priority and must centrally involve young people: 77.4% of Mozambique’s population is under 24. People-centred approaches that build ownership through planning and budgeting are vital for addressing the illicit economy and harnessing Mozambique’s natural resource wealth as a pathway for inclusive development. Questions around community benefits from mining activities are central to improving natural resource governance; despite good policies in place (2.75% of mining revenues allocated for local communities) there are complaints that money is not reaching local levels.
Development money appears to be flowing in. This includes a $100 million World Bank grant focusing on social cohesion, access to basic services, public infrastructure and restoring livelihoods – the first part of a $700m grant. This will flow through the government’s Integrated Development Agency – yet there are already concerns about transparency and effectiveness of this institution. Critically, the state’s extraordinary development challenges rooted in fragility demand attention. 

​Humanitarian and development efforts need to be driven with steadfast attention to peace, as the rising policy embrace of the HDP ‘triple nexus’ suggests. This means joint assessment and planning to address the root causes, both push and pull factors, through conflict and environmentally sensitive measures. A National Plan of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism is a paramount priority and should draw lessons from elsewhere – ensuring direct engagement with the local context and prioritisation of meaningful inclusion – especially youth and women. While the question of why the Mozambique government did not act sooner prevails, the need to shift attention towards more integrated, structural and inclusive solutions designed to prevent further occurrence and escalation of such threats remains paramount – for Cabo Delgado and beyond.

*Thank you to interviewees Horacio Zandemela and Thomas Selemane

​Erin McCandless is an Associate Professor in the School of Governance at Witwatersrand University in South Africa and a Research Associate with the German Development Institute (DIE).

Bernhard Trautner and Erin McCandless
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Original post

​10 years after the onset of the Arabellion, one of the few positive outlooks is on Joe Biden’s presidency. A Biden/Harris administration offers potential for perhaps subtle but potentially catalytic changes for the MENA region. With the incoming administration, Germany and Europe will find a partner who is interested in addressing the root causes of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and in building more sustainable social contracts in the different countries after the current pandemic. Undoubtedly Biden will have to focus first on domestic challenges such as managing the effects of the Corona pandemic, dealing with a massive polarisation between the political camps, reviving growth, reducing the excessive influence of the arms lobby and repairing US diplomacy and development policy. In the MENA region, he will try to revise some of the decisions taken by President Trump. The controversial appointment of Reema Dodin, a Palestinian American, as part of his legislative affairs team that shapes presidential policies, alongside plans to repeal Trump’s “Muslim Ban” suggests the potential for bold new agendas – both domestically and with respect to the MENA region.

Challenges for peace and development have increased in the MENA region since the last change of power in the US four years ago. This is partly due to Trump’s refusal to deliver on foreign policy: he did nothing to mediate in conflicts (for example in Yemen, Libya, Syria) but frankly strengthened regional powers and tolerated their involvement in these conflicts and the violations of international law and human rights. Critically, Trump has not inspired MENA countries to nurture inclusive transitions towards more participatory and egalitarian social contracts.

The next US administration will follow a different strategy for MENA but it will probably not be able to engage too heavily in the region, making Europe’s enhanced engagement a welcome contribution to defusing conflict in that region. The Biden administration will be quite busy with the post-pandemic, social and economic reconstruction in its own country, even with continuing domestic political blockade by a presumably Republican Senate in Congress and already excessively high foreign debt. Hence, it will hardly be willing to commit itself financially or militarily in the MENA region beyond the current state of contribution. Pending on re-joining an improved Nuclear Deal with Iran (‘JCPOA+’), President-elect Biden is probably going to discontinue Trump’s ‘unsmart’ sanctions against Iran: Implicitly aiming at the collapse of the Ayatollah regime, the sanctions actually strengthen the hardliner group in Iran. In Iraq, Biden might continue to pursue innovative foreign policy approaches as he did before, under Obama, by promoting the devolution of power in Iraq into federal or even independent states: one for the Kurds in the North and one for the rest of the country. Such approaches have potentially valuable transferability for other countries damaged by external intervention, such as Libya. But his position on many other issues is not yet clear – he may well seek to reset relations with Saudi Arabia and backtrack on intervention in Yemen.

In view of the mandate from the electorate, a Biden administration will undoubtedly cause less harm in the region than the Trump era but it will not be able to undo all the damage done so far. In addition, it remains an open question if the US will be a partner for autocrats, reformers, or both. Biden will need to build a reliable, principled approach to working with allies, mending relationships and taking decisions in the interests of sustainable transformation for the region – at the heart of which lies inclusive and responsive social contracts. He will not, and, given domestic economic challenges, he cannot revert to policing the region as earlier presidents have done.

Bearing this analysis in mind, a new German government from autumn 2021 will need to step up in terms of foreign, alliance and development policy vis-à-vis the MENA region. Together with the EU, Germany is already the largest donor in efforts to stabilise the quagmire around the Syria crisis and in Iraq, and Germany is crucially pivoting to support more sustainable post-conflict orders in the region. Together with a more coherent EU Southern Neighbourhood policy, and an increasingly rules-based US policy, MENA region citizens my regain inspiration and resilience against malignant domestic and external powers. More crucially, the region may find formidable obstacles removed that better enable Arab Spring aspirations, now a decade on, to be realised.
Erin McCandless is an Associate Professor at the School of Governance at Witwatersrand University in South Africa, and directs a research and policy dialogue project on forging resilient social contracts in countries transitioning from conflict and authoritarianism.

Erin McCandless and Bernhard Trautner
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)
Original post

Governments in the Middle East and in North Africa (MENA) are tackling the pandemic in different ways, many challenged by weak social systems and growing societal frustrations. In relatively prosperous (middle-income) countries – such as Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq – leaders have used the pandemic as an excuse to suppress justified protests at their lack of accountability and failure to provide basic services. For international cooperation, which supports the functioning of legitimate, accountable governments and resilient societies, this poses a critical challenge – as the case of Lebanon currently illuminates.

In seeming perpetual crisis, Yemen, Syria and Libya cycles of violent conflict have left profoundly fragile, rudimentary health care and social protection systems overwhelmed by the pandemic, and compounded by vast, growing inequalities and political fragility. As always, the most vulnerable are the hardest hit – the civilian population, and especially women, children, displaced persons and refugees.

By contrast, Tunisia, economically weak and by no means politically stable, appears to stand out in the region for addressing the virus head on. Tunisia took early and drastic measures initially to protect its population, and thus its economy over the longer term.

Despite the grave challenges in the region profoundly exacerbated by the pandemic, UN-Secretary General António Guterres recently reminded Arab leaders that that the pandemic also offers opportunities for resolving conflict and “building back better”, notably by addressing structural weaknesses and strengthening social contracts. 

Guterres’ suggests a paradigm shift by stating that ‘no one is safe until everyone is safe’. This captures our interdependent vulnerabilities, and demands a more holistic and inclusive view of threats to collective ‘human security’. The latter is integrally linked to environmental security, and it needs to form the core of our thinking and action globally.

It is in the vital interest of responsible governments to continue to improve, rather than dismantle or defund the international organisations that are seeking to tackle the interdependent root causes of human insecurity – including deep structural and horizontal inequalities within and across countries, and failing social contracts. Greater efforts must be made to understand state and society relationships, tackle constraints and support means to forge nationwide social contracts. 

The popular uprisings across the Arab Spring have, over the last decade, catalysed varying responses and outcomes for the fate of social contracts, and state-society relations in general. Tunisia, the initiator of the catalytic change movements, started genuine political reform. Following an extraordinarily inclusive and bottom-up transition, Tunisia introduced a regular trilateral social dialogue between labour unions, employer associations, and government. Earned public trust has now supported societal compliance with the government’s COVID-19 response.

For Syria, Yemen, Libya and Iraq, with long histories of failed social contracts and continued violent conflict and crisis, the pandemic and its emerging consequences demand radical measures. It is vital to break the path dependences and cycles of violence and fragility. This is easier said than done, where regional and international actors become part of the conflict. One global multi-country analysis of deeply divided societies underscores the imperative of tying national political settlements to robust and inclusive institutional arrangements that can transform structural sources of conflict,  and ensure delivery on promises. Critically, growing social cohesion – a driver of an inclusive social contract – is deeply connected to progress in these areas.

At the core of social cohesion lies the building of trust and delivering on the material needs and political expectations of societies. Greater trust lies at the core of more robust social contracts, and centrally supports whole of society willing compliance to government action, i.e. to a pandemic.  International support through political-normative, financial, and technical cooperation is vital in such contexts, to assist national actors in setting up multi-stakeholder dialogues and implementing robust agreements. Such agreements – manifestations of national social contracts – must hold promise for inclusive outcomes that tackle structural issues dividing societies and undermining development.

Critically, international actors must ensure coordinated support does not do harm – ultimately allowing national settings to organically grow peace. Efforts to address the pandemic within and across fragile and conflict affected countries must attune to these priorities and practices, if the notion of building back better is to be realised. Doing this is not rocket science anymore, due to ground-breaking insights about best practices in international cooperation by various institutions – even in times of pandemic.

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Mary Hope Schwoebel and Erin McCandless
Daily Maverick
Original Post

The global protests over the death of George Floyd will not by themselves create and sustain change — action needs to be taken to change policies and practices, to forge new social contracts that better reflect the principles that we are all sufficiently willing to live by.Asmug look on the white police officer’s face as he dug his knee into the black man’s neck, for nearly nine minutes, while the black man gasped for air and pleaded with the officer — “I can’t breathe” — has enraged citizens and leaders around the world. The video of this violent crime went viral. Ignoring lockdowns and risking Covid-19 contraction, crowds have mobilised and gathered around the world to voice their anger and show solidarity. Authorities have stood by, mostly allowing these gatherings in most settings. A key exception has been in parts of the United States, where this all began. 

Derek Chauvin, the white officer who knelt on George Floyd’s neck until his death, while three officers stood by without taking action, had 18 prior complaints filed against him. Police and military brutality targeting blacks more than other races is not only a feature of American politics. Similar concerns are being raised in the UK, in Australia. In South Africa, the security sector’s heavy-handed targeting of black townships and not in wealthier white suburbs to enforce the lockdown has not gone unnoticed. In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic around the world, the authoritarian measures of some states more generally, have raised alarm bells at the highest political levels.
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Protests occurring in far corners of the world are calling for “racial justice”, “no justice no peace”, and recognition that “black lives matter”, in support of the social movement by the same name that arose in 2013 to address the killing of an unarmed black teen and acquittal of his murderer. Protesters want the killing of black Americans by police stopped now, and for responsible police to be prosecuted and punished to the fullest extent of the law — including those who stand by and do nothing. Some are calling to defund and demilitarise the police. They want institutionalised racism in the police sector and beyond, uprooted and destroyed. And they are having an impact.

​The immediate goal of justice for Mr Floyd is advancing — with four officers fired, Chauvin’s charge elevated from 3rd to 2nd-degree murder, and the other three witnessing officers now being charged for aiding and abetting — a key demand of protesters. But this is unlikely to satisfy protesters. As Martin Luther King professed “…a riot is the language of the unheard” — and they will continue “as long as America postpones justice”. 

Clearly this tragic event has deep meaning, not just for Americans, but for people globally. The world is watching and participating in the unfolding and shaping of events. In this context we are pressed to ask: will these protests contribute to transformative change in the US? What ramifications does this have for supporting the achievement of racial, ethnic and other forms of social justice in countries around the world?

Varied forms of protest

At the time of this writing, protests gathering hundreds of thousands of people cumulatively are occurring in about 200 cities in the US and many other countries and cities — including in Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Denmark, Brussels, Amsterdam, Dublin, Brazil, Mexico, New Zealand, Canada, Poland, with solidarity acts even in war-torn Syria.

Leaders around the US and globally at all levels of government have stood in support of the protesters. Many politicians, police and military are standing with protesters’ right to assembly. The majority of Americans, with variation across social groups and age, support the protests in general. This includes former and current military leaders. In numerous instances, police and the National Guard have knelt in solidarity with the protesters.

The United Nations has also taken a stand. Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, criticised structural racism at the heart of police violence and highlighted “credible reports of unnecessary and disproportionate use of force” by US law enforcement officers. She called upon leaders to “condemn racism unequivocally” and to “reflect on what has driven people to a boiling point; to listen and learn; and to take actions that truly tackle inequalities”.

In Africa, numerous leaders are speaking out. The African Union Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, made a statement strongly condemning the murder, and urging US authorities to intensify efforts to ensure the total elimination of all forms of discrimination based on race or ethnic origin.

The South African government has called upon all Americans and especially the security forces, to “exercise maximum restraint in responding to the anger and frustration felt by so many of its citizens, friends and international partners”. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) spokesperson stated:
“It is deplorable that almost 70 years since racial segregation was abolished in America, people of colour are still routinely slaughtered for the colour of their skin. The ANC fought and defeated racial supremacy and will not be cowed to remain silent in the face of the lynching of black people wherever they manifest.” At the same time, South Africans are noting the uncomfortable parallels of police and military brutality and stalled social and economic justice at home. 

While the vast majority of protests in the US are nonviolent, the looting, burning and other acts of violence occurring have captured media, and the president’s, attention. Many believe this distracts attention from the real issues. Numerous theories are being espoused about the identity of these instigators. Right-wing commentators and the president himself are blaming left-wing elements, including Antifa, an amorphous group of anti-fascists — while the evidence for this is questioned. Leftist commentators allege that the looting is being carried out by Trump’s base and even Russian agents.

While Trump is using the looting to militarise the situation, many citizens see the protests as a show of profound solidarity among diverse peoples in the US and globally, a willingness to mobilise over a racial injustice. 

State violence 

Reflecting on these events, comedian Trevor Noah has questioned what interests black Americans have in upholding the social contract — the principles and agreements that define us as a people — if leaders who are entrusted to protect them are not doing so.

The murder of George Floyd is merely the latest of dozens of such incidents of police brutality. Normally, national leaders have sought to bring the nation together in the manifestations of anger that have followed, even if they did little to address or prevent these racist acts and their systemic roots. President Trump, who has been a divisive leader fuelling polarisation in the US, has issued a steady stream of inflammatory tweets and statements. His infamous tweet, “When the looting starts, the shooting starts” essentially gave a green light to the police to use force against protesters.

Trump has deployed more than 17,000 National Guard troops in 23 states, including Washington DC. Tens of thousands of protesters have been arrested nationwide and law enforcement has deployed tear gas, pepper spray, tasers, batons and rubber bullets against protesters. Perhaps the most egregious use of force was against peaceful protesters (including clerics) from surrounding areas of St John’s Church to create a photo opportunity of himself holding the Bible and threatening protesters with the full force of military troops.

A 2015 report by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) showed that black people in Minneapolis, the northern city in which George Floyd lost his life, are 8.7 times more likely than white people to be arrested for low-level offences. Racist and violent policing has been a problem in Minnesota for decades. For example, Minneapolis police rendered 44 people unconscious with neck restraints within five years, and within 20 years, they killed black people at a rate 13 times higher than white people. These statistics reflect police brutality nationwide.

Over a half a century after the civil rights laws were passed, institutionalised racism in the US persists, backed up by laws and policies that obstruct black Americans from achieving economic and political equality. “Redline laws” that allow banks and insurance companies to deny loans to people who live in “poor” neighbourhoods deemed financial risks ensure vastly uneven home ownership among blacks and whites.

Average family wealth for whites in the US is $171,000, and $17,150 for black families. Black women suffer from the intersection of sexism and racism; they have to work seven extra months for their income to equal that of black men. Black voters continue to be disenfranchised due to a byzantine gerrymandering system and laws in some states preventing prisoners, and even ex-prisoners who have served their time, from voting. Black Americans are incarcerated at five times the rate of white Americans. 

Institutionalised racism has meant that black and brown Americans have suffered disproportionately from Covid-19. Research has shown the African American mortality rate was, on average, 2.2 times higher than the rate for Latinx people, 2.3 times higher than Asians, and 2.6 times higher than for whites. This is in part due to higher rates of diseases that render people vulnerable to Covid-19 — heart disease, diabetes, obesity and asthma. These diseases generally go hand in hand with economic distress, lack of access to healthy food, air pollution, lack of access to healthcare, and substandard housing. In addition, US prisons have been breeding grounds for Covid-19 as there have been inadequate efforts to protect prisoners from the virus.

From protest to change 

Protests are rising as a social phenomenon globally, and the power of protest is certainly becoming more visible. A quarter of the world’s countries saw a concerted rise in civil unrest in 2019 — with predictions that this will continue for 2020. 

Research on nonviolent resistance movements and protests are broadly showing their positive impacts in supporting the achievement of peace and inclusive democracy. Chenoweth and Stephan examined 323 cases of civil resistance in overcoming tyranny and oppression in authoritarian contexts, between 1900 and 2006. Exploring the effectiveness of non-violent versus violent approaches, they found that sustained, peaceful transitions were more likely where non-violent strategies were used. Why? Non-violent civil resistance movements tend to have high levels of diverse participation, and they win over security forces and tend to establish more inclusive institutions while catering to the rights of minorities and promoting human rights.
Similarly, our prior research points to the importance of protests contributing to the forging of more inclusive and resilient social contracts. In a nine-country study on forging resilient social contracts, the cases of South Africa and Tunisia stood out in this regard.
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At the same time, the global nature of these protests speaks to something else. On the one hand, an identification with the cause — rooted in a rising agreement — among citizens and especially younger generations — that bad behaviour of leaders will no longer be tolerated. Borders matter less with violations of conscience — why shouldn’t 10,000 people gather in Amsterdam during lockdown to say NO MORE knees on necks of black men in American, 8,000km away?

Similarly, as Trump’s transgressions — verbal and physical — towards and about women, went viral around the time of his inauguration, the global upswell of millions of women, and men, gathering for the Women’s March on 21 January 2017 was telling. Dr King similarly argued in a 1960 essay, “The Rising Tide of Racial Consciousness”, that the struggle of African Americans in the US was part of a worldwide struggle.

Connecting protests to politics 

​Calls are being made by community leaders in the US to connect protests to formal politics — especially voting. Atlanta-based rapper, actor and activist Michael Santiago Render, or “Killer Mike” states that now is the time to “plot, plan, strategise, organise, mobilise” — to take protests to the voting booth and change leadership. Barack Obama’s message has similarly underscored the need to combine protests with politics, and to “elect candidates who will act on reform”.

Reflections on strategies for change among social movements have a long history. Revolution or reform? Participation or resistance? Tree shakers or jam makers? Non-reformist reform versus reformist reform? Vibrant debates on the left spanning centuries continue today, morphing, but are ultimately concerned with questions of what specific strategies, tactics, formations and coalitions will foment transformational change. Peace theorists equally underscore the need to combine activism with peace processes to achieve structural change and positive peace — or peace with justice. 

​It should be clear by now that radical efforts depicted by masses in the streets play a profoundly important role in raising consciousness, driving and building solidarity on issues, clarifying what people will and will not stand for, and holding politicians and leaders accountable. It should also be clear that protests do not by themselves create and sustain change — action needs to be taken to change policies and practices, to forge new social contracts that better reflect the principles that we are all sufficiently willing to live by. 

This, of course, is not easy in deeply polarised societies. Visionary leadership is needed to bring people together. Ballot box changes are certainly important, but require steadfast commitment over time, as progressive changes can be easily overturned, for example, when a Trump comes into power. 
There should be little disagreement at this point that addressing systemic racism and other forms of structural violence require systemic, structural measures. The idea that the market’s “free hand” will bring peace and prosperity for all has simply not proven to be the case — indeed it has had the opposite effect. The global protests, violent conflict and state fragility around the world are indicators that the political economy model dominating world politics is simply not working for all. 

In addition to finding agreement around a political economy model that better serves people and the environment, addressing structural violence requires targeted attention. This may come in the form of reparative measures — to compensate in some way for the historical legacies disadvantaging black communities and their ancestors from the time of slavery, strengthening affirmative action measures or an intentional “transformation agenda” — of the type South Africa is engaging in.

​While politicians often fear these measures for the demands from all corners they might unleash, it is too late for such fears. We must address our structural legacies, and equally for other groups harmed in and through history such as indigenous peoples, in the US and around the globe. The US desperately needs to engage in national dialogue and truth and reconciliation processes.

Personally, we all need to step up to take responsibility in righting historical wrongs — even in individual and everyday ways. We need to work together to recraft social contracts that are inclusive and resilient. 
As the #GeorgeFloyd Protests reveal, and equally as the Covid-19 pandemic has done, our social contracts also increasingly lie with a global citizenry. We now need to ensure that Floyd’s death, which has catalysed profound global protest, drives true systemic change. DM

​Erin McCandless is Associate Professor in the Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand. She works in and on countries affected by conflict and fragility, and studies transitions to just, sustained peace. 
Mary Hope Schwoebel is Associate Professor in the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Nova Southeastern University in Florida in the US. She has 30 years’ experience in the fields of peacebuilding, governance, humanitarian assistance and development in, among others, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Kenya, Peru, Pakistan, Colombia, Turkey, Nepal and Indonesia.

Darlene Miller and Erin McCandless
Daily Maverick
Original Post

Social cohesion lies in trust and respect, belonging and identity, and participation. When this fails, and human rights are violated, these bonds, ties and relationships suffer – as does trust in the state and its institutions, and the legitimacy needed for their functioning.
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A security sector student at the Wits School of Governance a few years ago challenged a lecturer, saying, “I kill people. What can you teach me here?” An isolated incident, and yet one that was unsettling for those of us intent on bringing peace and development into our approach to security.
In the current Covid-19 national disaster, as part of his comprehensive intervention, the president deployed troops in South Africa’s residential areas. This was deemed necessary as a measure to ensure compliance with our nation’s lockdown measures since 20 March 2020 – 73,000 troops were deployed for this purpose. Criticisms have followed the military’s conduct in townships, with anecdotal evidence of abuses against citizens. The United Nations characterised our lockdown as authoritarian and “toxic”.

While President Cyril Ramaphosa has offered peaceful messaging to guide the security forces – that they should be a force of kindness and compassion, defending the people, and some radio phone-ins evidence that many in the security sector are following this path – some SANDF and SAPs members have abused their power.  These have included shootings, baton and gun beatings, teargassing, humiliation, abusive language, water bombing, and invasion of backyard spaces. This has occurred more in townships than in suburbs, where human rights violations have occurred.

Under apartheid, authoritarian rule in residential spaces was implemented by the police and the military. For black South Africans, obedience to the state was secured with violence and aggression. The prospect of a return to authoritarianism in everyday life is not something that many South Africans would treasure.

​The disturbing aspect of these township abuses is that they build on both prevailing political cultures and legacies of brutal patriarchal masculinities, where discipline is enforced through violence against a subordinate or someone that is perceived as vulnerable.
Heralded by the World Health Organisation for swift action to address the pandemic, South Africa is also the recipient of international scorn. Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that emergency powers “should not be a weapon Governments can wield to quash dissent, control the population, and even perpetuate their time in power”. South Africa was among 15 countries identified where the violations were most troubling.
As concerns for authoritarian measures around the world mount, South Africa’s particular history demands attention to these issues to stay on course with goals of democracy and transformation.

Civil (dis)obedience

The responsibility of citizens in the current context is at issue too. The night before lockdown, videos were shared on social media of a massive street party in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. The latest township jive at this street party included chanting “CORONA!” in a semi-celebratory way. 
People brandished beers and alcohol in their hands. All this suggested that some segments of the nation were gearing up for an extended party during lockdown. Suburbanites meanwhile, watched in horror from the safety of their homes and their iPhones as this civil disobedience erupted. The cigarette and alcohol ban implemented by the state in lockdown and into the downgraded Level 4 has sobered our ebullient fellow citizens, who now hustle Kent and other cheap cigarettes on the black market.
Many township residents resent the deepened deprivation and security sector heavy-handedness that came with lockdown, and varied forms of civil disobedience have resulted. When civilians disobey, it is in part a rebellion against conditions that to them are inhumane. In these conditions, lockdown then has to be enforced through coercion rather than consent, and a military steeped in masculine cultures of violence may flaunt and abuse the personal power that attaches to their surveillance role.

The social compact

These abuses are concerning trends that undermine the potential for a resilient social compact on Covid-19, and opportunities that the crisis presents for its strengthening. We argue that, in addition to a critical focus needed on addressing the differential socioeconomic impacts and needs of vulnerable groups, greater attention is needed on how policies instrumental to addressing the pandemic are implemented, with an eye towards building social cohesion and ensuring that social solidarity is nurtured through this crisis.
On 21 April, Rhamaposa laid out the government’s phased economic plan to respond to the Covid-19 virus, requiring a “new social compact among all role players – business, labour, community and government – to restructure the economy and achieve inclusive growth”.
Research across nine countries engaging the social contract concept, including in the South African context, found that social cohesion is a key driver, and that its achievement rests on progress by other drivers – inclusive political settlements addressing core issues dividing people, and institutions delivering fairly and effectively.
Social cohesion, both vertically (between state and society) and horizontally (between citizens and groups in society), lies in areas of trust and respect, belonging and identity, and participation. People need to feel included and that they belong – and that policies and practices deliver on expectations and agreements. When this fails, and further, human rights are violated in the process, these bonds, ties and relationships suffer – as does trust in the state and its institutions, and associated legitimacy needed for their functioning. The psychological sense of unity at the heart of social solidarity also suffers, as people see and feel that unfair and unequal treatment playing out.

Resilient social compacting and the way forward

What is a resilient social compact? At the broadest level, it can be considered a dynamic agreement between state and society and groups in society on how to live together, and how to address issues of power and resources. For such an agreement to contribute to peace and societal wellbeing, it must be reflected in mechanisms, policies and responses, that uphold the agreement, and how these are implemented – in ways that are flexible and responsive and particularly in times of crisis. 

We need to work towards this in the South African context. The use of the social compact to guide policy direction is not new for South Africa, yet critically, this economic framing misses social and political elements needed to support transformative outcomes.
Class formation in South Africa follows racial geographies of suburbs and townships, with suburbs still predominantly white after 26 years of democracy, and poor, crime-ridden townships still predominantly black. These are structural conditions that do not change with legislation and social grants; these are also the conditions that bedevil policy implementation. The intersection of class and race geographies makes the implementation of a social compact potentially unachievable.
There is no question therefore about Covid-19 presenting profound challenges for citizens and the state. Citizens have had to radically change their lives overnight, with terrifying loss of livelihoods for many, and profoundly challenging new social conditions for most. The state is having to deliver on governance and public service delivery functions – in a radically altered setting, characterised by an extreme security threat and deep economic crisis. 

Building trust and cooperation, vertically between state and society, and horizontally between social and stakeholder groups in society, is paramount.
Acknowledging that South Africa’s deep structural inequalities cannot be transformed overnight, several measures are paramount to support resilient social compacting during the pandemic.
Like poor people around the world, township residents develop strong bonds of social cohesion based on survival. Such survival requires social interaction, much of it physical in high-density living spaces. As the state and the economy fail these residents, they have no option but to turn to one another for help.

First, there must be vigilant government commitment to the notion that coercion is not a good foundation for a social compact. Swift action on security sector abuses and effective communication with the populaces affected is needed. This should accompany strong assurances for accountability and justice, and upscaled training of SANDF and SAPS in crisis response functions.

Second, more attention is needed towards two-way communication channels that offer means to build trust and legitimacy of government actions. This is particularly vital in crisis settings, where constitutional deviation is in play. Township residents must be able help shape the nature of the security and other crisis response measures being taken in their name. Widely accessible and consistent messaging is needed, with clarity around criteria and principles guiding policy.
As the sociologist Emile Durkheim stressed, social solidarity is forged when each segment of society works together at their various and prescribed roles and functions, cooperating for the greater social good. Such solidarity efforts are currently widespread in South Africa and around the world.

Like poor people around the world, township residents develop strong bonds of social cohesion based on survival. Such survival requires social interaction, much of it physical in high-density living spaces. As the state and the economy fail these residents, they have no option but to turn to one another for help.

The People’s Coalition has demonstrated ways of educating residents during this crisis in ways that build social solidarity. These stories need to be better shared to support greater unity in addressing this crisis – with a view to strengthening longer-term transformation efforts in South Africa.
These networks of social cohesion (Mosoetsa, S. 2011) and social solidarity may in many cases be more important than the government, which has failed to provide these communities with the decent livelihoods that they need.

The late Ben Turok, ANC leader and Member of Parliament, repeatedly reminded us in the early days of democratic transition that we needed to take care to be different from other post-independent African states who had turned from revolution and social democratic policies to authoritarianism and military government.

​Extending our military tentacles into townships and residential areas has the potential to militarise governance in our country, particularly in townships where rebellion and poverty undermine prospects of a national social compact and civil obedience. If the dignity of citizens is not respected, a resilient social compact becomes just more rhetoric in the South African polity. DM
Dr Darlene Miller is Senior Lecturer and Erin McCandless Associate Professor in the Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand. This article builds on a shorter article in The Conversation.
​Read More

Erin McCandless
Bretton Woods Project.
​Original Post

​By 2030, more than half of the world’s poor will live in fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS). Recognising this worsening fragility, conflict and violence (FCV) landscape, the World Bank has doubled its lending and grants to FCAS to $14 billion from 2014 to 2018. As the World Bank is now eliciting feedback on its 2020-2025 Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence, this piece critically appraises the proposed FCV agenda.

​In its strategy, the Bank proposes a diversified approach to address “the drivers, or underlying causes, of FCV and the dynamics that keep countries or sub-regions trapped in fragility.” Adopting analysis from the 2018 United Nations-World Bank Pathways for Peace report, drivers involve (problematic) structures, (weak) institutions, and (bad) behaviours of a variety of actors who breed and fuel fragility through “mutually reinforcing incentive structures and vested interests.” The challenge then, involves positively changing incentives and influencing behaviours.
Amidst wide ranging proposals, the Bank suggests this requires careful prioritisation and sequencing of initiatives with multistakeholder commitment, transformational methodologies and coordinated public and private sector-driven development solutions. It involves building state institutions, promoting private enterprise, and mitigating FCV impacts on the most vulnerable. All levels – community, sub-national, state, regional – must be engaged.

Is the analysis solid?The Bank’s analysis of FCV trends, drawing on expansive evidence-based research from many reputable institutions, is hard to dispute. The conclusions of what drives fragility, that development in FCV contexts requires different approaches, and that FCV context analysis must inform strategy, are profoundly important, but not new insights. The global policy dialogue with its New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States promulgated similar messages over the last decade.

A key problem running across the Bank’s FCV analysis – and even that of the United Nations – is the continuing absence of reflection upon the impacts and implications of neoliberal economic policies on these very drivers of conflict and fragility. Well-documented adverse impacts include increased inequality and poverty, lowering of human development indicators and even growth – the Bank’s principal objective – all of which are now increasingly reasons for uprisings in many parts of the world.

While this is consistent with analyses and proposals of scholars, practitioners and activists, critical issues are left wanting. Promoting conflict sensitivity and requiring corporate social responsibility are vital. But to what extent will such efforts genuinely transform power asymmetries that multinational companies wield in relation to vulnerable communities and weak governments? How will the economic drivers of fragility, such as macro-economic shocks, inequalities and unemployment, be tackled? This will require engaging the deep structures of underdevelopment. While the Bank’s increased financing suggests a system-wide, embracing of FCV, how will it transform its own orthodox development theory and economic policy directives rooted in financially driven incentives to bring needed changes to structures, institutions and behaviours in FCV countries? How consistent is the Maximizing Finance for Development flagship programme with such goals (see Observer Autumn 2018)? How will it address the fact that it is remains an important financier of fossil fuels (see Observer Spring 2018)?

Critically, the concept note is silent on what the Pathways for Peace report recognised as a core driver of conflict and its developmental results in FCV contexts – horizontal inequalities (actual and perceived) between groups. This is a deeply political issue, and the Bank’s mandate disallows its engagement in politics. Yet, we know that development, and therefore the Bank’s programmes and activities, cannot be separated from politics.

Is the Bank best suited to play these proposed roles?The strategy “requires an expanded [Bank] footprint, one that ensures the right skills are in the right place at the right time.” This is concerning firstly because we need international community commitments to national ownership in peacebuilding, statebuilding and development honoured. Rather than creating new international structures and capacities in and through the Bank to work on FCV, why not 1) invest resources in promoting inclusive, democratic national leadership to tackle the issues, and 2) acknowledge the strong UN and international non-governmental organisation presence in most FCV settings, step back and support these? A critical role that is appropriate for the Bank is in ensuring conflict- and fragility sensitive economic policy is delivered through its loans and grants.

​In closing, the Bank’s strategy proposals offer important avenues to address elements of FCV. Analysis suggests that they do not go far enough however, to address systemic challenges within the global development system itself. Critically, more innovation is needed to address the interconnected challenges of FCV, and it is likely to lie in efforts that foster transformation, engage endogenous diversities in societies, and forge inclusive, resilient social contracts.

by Erin McCandless, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa

Erin McCandless
IPI Global Observatory
Original Post 
​
The striking increase in violent conflict over the last 15 years has been marked by the number of violent conflicts tripling since 2010 and the rise of non-state actor conflict in many regions. Amid the untold suffering there has been an important positive impact: policy consensus at the highest levels that sustaining peace and preventing violent conflict must be priorities. This is good news, as prevention will not only save lives, but also resources. A new World Bank and United Nations report, Pathways to Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, concludes that up to tens of billions in losses in countries and billions for the international community in interventions can be saved per year through prevention.

This report, and the Security Council mandated agenda that preceded it, increase the United Nations’ commitment to more strategic analysis and action on these issues. While these are exciting developments, perhaps most importantly due to the level at which they have taken hold, important questions remain: what can be done that has not been tried before? And, vitally, how to ensure national actors—states and societies—are steadfastly in the driver’s seat of action?

Many may point to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which clearly speaks to issues of peace, governance, and security as means to facilitating coherent national action.  Indeed, governments are developing roadmaps for the agenda’s realization. While the agenda goes beyond traditional development frameworks, led by development actors, it remains fundamentally challenged to address the underlying politics that too often mediate against a unified analysis of conflict and fragility, and drives partnered commitments for key priorities deserving action across the wider political and security realms. Arguably something else is needed, but what?

Building upon my previous analysis, there is a need to embrace a unifying concept that frames thinking and actionable ideas in order to better support the development of a national vision for peace that cuts across the security, political, and development realms: the social contract. Drawing on earlier findings from an eleven-country study called Forging Resilient National Social Contracts: Preventing Violent Conflict and Sustaining Peace—supported by a working group of scholars, policy advisers, and partners from the UN Development Program (UNDP) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung—allows us to conceive of how a social contract approach can provide both the conceptual inspiration for a vision that national stakeholders can rally behind, and the elements of an integrated practical framework that engages vital pillars, siloes, phases, and dimensions of transitioning out of conflict and fragility.

From Political Settlements to Resilient, Inclusive Social Contracts

Transcending elite bargains and forging and linking more inclusive and transparent political settlements to durable arrangements for peace is an increasingly agreed upon and evidence-based foundation for both achieving and sustaining peace. It is also a cornerstone of a social contract in countries emerging from conflict and fragility—encompassing inclusive, transparent, and institutionalised arrangements that deliver results and build trust within society and with the state.

Amidst the array of findings still in development, the aforementioned study explores how this process of moving from a political settlement to a societally owned, resilient national social contract can be assessed and understood, with important implications for policy and practice. It does this through an examination of three postulated drivers of such a contract, through a proposed framework of “Institutional Spheres and Mechanisms of Social Contract Making.” Consistent with the policy consensus that addressing root causes of conflict and grievances is a requirement for peace, the study investigates how core conflict issues (CCIs)—issues that, unlike grievances and root causes, are neutrally articulated and broadly agreed upon by conflict parties and society at large—are being progressively addressed, over time. Specifically, this means understanding how commitments made in the peacemaking sphere at the national and political level (e.g. through a peace agreement) are linked to and addressed in other spheres and through related mechanisms of “social contract-making” in support of comprehensive, societally-owned addressing of the issues.

The logic of a few of the findings so far around nine cases—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Cyprus, Nepal, South Africa, South Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen and Zimbabwe—summarized below, provide important takeaways.

The early stages of the peace negotiations, and notably the peace agreement, offer possibilities for redefining parameters for inclusion and exclusion, and positioning of different groups and issues, often with long-term effects and positive or negative repercussions. This finding reinforces research around inclusive settlements with new case evidence, illustrating how this occurs, whether positively through the catalysing of more inclusive politics, and negatively by: the development of separate ethno-nationalist institutions; citizens or groups feeling excluded and becoming spoilers; and the propensity for informal agreements that undermine the official agreement and process.
Second, CCIs have often not been effectively addressed over time or through previous peace processes and agreements, which directly undermines the inclusiveness of the political settlement. This occurs in different ways, for example in the agreement design or its implementation, and at times, through extant contradictions around provisions that undermine agreement implementation. Intriguing case illustrations are identified and shared in the full summary.

Another finding builds upon these two, namely that social contract-making spheres and mechanisms are often not well-linked in ways that promote the implementation of peace agreements in a coherent and effective way and the development of an increasingly inclusive political settlement. Other findings illustrate more specifically where break downs occur, for example in state institutions, the hardware for carrying forward peace agreement implementation, and similarly, non-state and customary institutions, that are often not sufficiently or systematically engaged in addressing CCIs, including at sub-national levels.

​Together, these findings arguably offer a valuable way to both assess and understand how peace agreements, and the political settlements underlying them, can soundly address the core issues that drive conflict, and transition into a more lasting formula, namely an inclusive, resilient social contract that has sound institutional support. These and other insightful findings around inclusive processes and social cohesion offer an innovative, conceptual, and practical framing that may help to address a number of the priority concerns and challenges being elevated in the aforementioned policy arena. They also suggest areas of ongoing complexity that deserve attention, lest old mistakes on international strategy regenerate in ways that can ultimately run counter to the deepened commitment to prevention that is taking shape. Perhaps most importantly, this research offers a fresh approach to support synergistic efforts across peace, security, and development sectors and pillars, in ways that put national actors in the drivers’ seat for developing a common vision for peace. Ultimately, the study’s evidence illustrates that strong movement on the three postulated drivers holds particular weight in the achievement of a resilient national social contract that drives and sustains peace.

Valuable broadly for national and international actors working on peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development, the study holds particular relevance for the UN as the Secretary-General’s report launches in late February. While the greatly anticipated report focuses on what the UN system needs to do to strengthen policy and practice coherence, leadership, partnerships, and financing to effectively support the sustaining peace agenda, the substantive content of what sustaining peace means in and across countries remains the heart of the matter.

​Erin McCandless is the Research and Project Director of “Forging Resilient Social Contracts,” and teaches in the Graduate Program of International Affairs at The New School in New York.

Erin McCandless
Civil Society Platform
Original Post

​Exciting movements are underway in and around the United Nations for those of us concerned with issues of peace, and the global agendas seeking to operationalize, and realize, new frameworks and revitalized agendas to ensure a better world for all. Over the last year we have seen significant movements to assess and reorient United Nations' efforts towards greater commitments to sustaining peace and preventing conflict, as signified in April 27, 2016 twin Security Council/General Assembly Resolutions [1], We have also seen the adoption [2] of new global development framework – Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – that for the first time places peace concerns prominently at its core. It does this on the one hand by placing peace one of five areas of critical importance identified in the Preamble, and by dedicating one of 17 goals to the topic of peaceful, just and inclusive societies.
On January 10 of this year, new member of the Security Council Sweden took swift, admirable action to build upon the commitments laid out in the twin resolutions by hosting a Security Council ministerial level debate on sustaining peace and conflict prevention [3]. This important debate was opened by the new United Nations Secretary General António Guterres himself, as he threw his weight squarely behind the two resolutions, promising to "rebalance" United Nations efforts and place far greater attention on preventing violent conflict. He highlighted 2017 as the year OF peace and a year FOR peace.
It is worth stating that reflecting on parallel, and undoubtedly complementary agendas is a worthy goal – at the most basic level, to promote coherence which lies at the heart of effective peacebuilding. But it is not easy.
Presently there are efforts to bring these two agendas (sustaining peace/conflict prevention and Agenda 2030) together. In anticipation of the January 24 United Nations High Level Dialogue "Building Sustainable Peace for All: Synergies between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustaining Peace" [4] – and to introduce the first of what will hopefully be a semi-regular blog series broadly covering the topic of forging and sustaining peace – I am sharing some of my thinking that has evolved over time and in relation to my policy and practice work on issues that lie at the heart of these agendas and their intersections.
It is worth stating that reflecting on parallel, and undoubtedly complementary agendas is a worthy goal – at the most basic level, to promote coherence which lies at the heart of effective peacebuilding. But it is not easy. I just had the opportunity with New Deal constituency colleagues to do precisely this – reflect upon how our New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (a framework and policy dialogue process) will align with the new Agenda 2030 – which our three constituencies (the g7+ network of countries affected by conflict, OECD/DAC donor countries - INCAF, and civil society - CSPPS - the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding) were very active in supporting the creation of. The result of this six months of reflection, debate, and negotiation is here.

A key argument that I want to make in this post may be obvious, but requires steadfast, genuine attention. Having concepts, frameworks and strategies is a vital starting point, but it is just that, a starting point. Ongoing ownership of these agendas is clearly what matters at the end of the day for implementation, for realization of the aspirations embedded in these agendas. Meaningfully inclusive processes lie at the core of ownership, and these processes must begin and end in countries, with appropriate nurturing and accompaniment by international actors. At the same time, we cannot deny nor neglect the reality that many drivers of conflict and fragility are transnational and international in origin and motive, and thus require international partnership to address. While these two agendas represent a profoundly important step in a growing universal consciousness about what is needed to fuel sustainable peace and development for all, there is much work to do to ensure they are owned, actively pursued, and realized at national levels.  
 
After sharing some reflections on the two agendas at hand and their important intersections, I’ll close with some thoughts on how our experiences from the New Deal – which are inextricably linked to Agenda 2030 and the twin resolutions – offer insight, and added value if effectively utilized, for bringing these two agendas together, on the ground, where it matters most.
 
Sustaining Peace and Preventing Conflict
 
While undoubtedly many might roll their eyes at these topics being heralded anew, given that both have been around and valued, particularly by scholar-practitioners, for decades – their movement to the top of the UN agenda must simply be welcomed. It illustrates, finally, that these are not marginal issues, or issue of “low politics” in realpolitik terms. They are paramount to achieving globally agreed goals, and reflective of the widening recognition that paying for the repercussions of war is simply too costly – there needs to be a robust commitment to prevention, which has faced considerable resistance by member states over time, with concern around implications for their sovereignty, amongst other things. At the same time, certainly some will fear that escalation of these agendas to the level to the Security Council may simply create a host of new obstacles, and serve to politicize and dilute the issues. A fair concern. Though, positively, Security Council attention to climate change and HIV/AIDs appears to be more helpful than harmful.
 
The back and forth on whether and how to address and approach issues of sustaining peace and conflict prevention over the years at the UN illustrates the profound complexities underlying questions of how to address these topics – conceptually, politically, ideologically, operationally. While a key goal of the UN is to “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” – enshrined in the UN Charter – the challenge of course is gaining agreement on what constitutes “threats to peace.” We know that these are often conceived of very differently by different actors – be they governments and civil societies, Northern and Southern actors, and/or members of different ethnic, racial and income groups within and across societies.
The evolution of the field of peacebuilding, and the United Nations policy documents and instruments focused on the peacebuilding agenda illustrate the challenges of achieving lasting consensus on how to conceptualize and operationalize the notion of sustaining peace, encapsulated historically in the notion of peacebuilding. While, for example, the Agenda for Peace (1992) suggested that peacebuilding was a post-conflict tool to follow peacekeeping, and the Supplement (1995) expanded the notion to refer to all stages of the conflict/peace cycle, the 2005 development of the UN’s Peacebuilding “architecture” reverted to a post-conflict understanding of its role.

And despite the rising awareness of the problem of conflict recurrence and the need to address root causes and remain engaged in conflict settings, it was only seven years ago when the Secretary General, guided by the new leadership of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture, decided its primary focus should be on the “immediate aftermath” of conflict. Some of us pushed back on this. At the time, I had the opportunity with eight other scholar/policy oriented practitioners to reflect on where the UN’s peacebuilding architecture needed to go, and in my paper I argued that:

“the new focus on the immediate aftermath of conflict supported by the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) crowds out important debates surrounding potential core drivers or building blocks of sustainable peace. Strengthened efforts are needed to conceptually and practically link this ‘early recovery’ period with longer-term peace.”
 
I then examined five “core drivers of peace sustainability,” drawing on scholarly and policy literature and practice, around: 1) peace operations and sustaining international commitment; 2) coordination, integration, transition, strategy – particularly around the strategies, frameworks and processes for addressing drivers and root causes of conflict; 3) national capacity development, for conflict management; 4) economic recovery; 5) addressing obstacles to peace sustainability, i.e. proliferation of unregulated armed groups and their lack of attention in post-conflict DDR and SSR processes (receiving more attention today thankfully), poorly regulated natural resources, illicit drugs and organized crime; lack of trust in peace processes and lack of political will and appropriate mandates for which progress can be measured and actors held accountable. These five drivers I believe remain central, both for sustaining peace and preventing conflict – in particular conflict renewal or reversion, but also simply preventing new conflict – especially driver 3 – building on the longstanding commitments, often not honored, to put national actors in the driver’s seat of change in their countries.
 
Thankfully attention is now reignited towards thinking about what sustains peace, not just in the immediate aftermath of conflict, but over the long-term. This movement, embraced in the two twin resolutions, grew from findings of the 2015 “AGE” report – a study by an Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) as part of the review process mandated by the Security Council and the General Assembly for the tenth anniversaries of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The twin resolutions highlight sustaining peace in a way that reorients the notion of peacebuilding to one that must take place in all phases – as an effort that happens before, during and after conflict – thus making it a responsibility of the whole UN – and not just one agency.  According to the resolutions and drawing from the AGE report, sustaining peace:
 
“should be broadly understood as  goal and a process to build a common vision of society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, which encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development, and emphasizing that sustaining peace is a shared task and responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by the government and all other national stakeholders, and should flow through all three pillars of the United Nations’ engagement at all stages of conflict, and in all its dimensions, and needs sustained international attention and assistance,”
 
Those who follow the UN and more generally debates over the years on peacebuilding know that there is nothing terribly new here. But again, accepting it at the level of Security Council and General Assembly through formal resolutions is new, signaling high level commitments upon which concerted action can be built. It is also refreshing to see this level, finally, of commitment to the notion of “root causes” – which has been the subject of great waffling and substantive debate over the years (I summarize in this piece).

The important point here is that national actors must ultimately retain responsibility for addressing root causes, while the outstanding question of what role international actors have in this regard remains poignant. I have argued in this same piece that we can facilitate space, and accompany. Of course it becomes complicated if national governments are totally unwilling to move in the direction of addressing root causes. In such cases – DRC, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and even Zimbabwe come to mind – fragility prevails. In this sense the resolutions underscore the inherently political nature of peacebuilding – though I believe more needs to be done to unveil what this means for operationalizing the sustaining peace agenda. Particularly as we reflect upon links with the development agenda, which thankfully now has more political entry points than the previous, Millennium Development agenda – notably with Goal 16.
 
Other welcome elements of this conceptualization, are the notion of the common vision of society (which suggests entry points for national development planning processes, and the national prioritization of goals and targets needed to realize Agenda 2030 within countries), and the underscoring of the need for inclusive processes, highlighting women and youth, amongst wider civil society. This reflects the formalization of this emerging norm of inclusivity in peacemaking and peacebuilding – of course welcome news for civil society interests around the world. Sadly, these commitments face challenges globally with shrinking space for civil society to operate where governments feel threatened and prefer closed systems. These commitments also may face grave challenges in the context of a Trump presidency if prevailing prognoses are right – where authoritarian and extremist political processes, globally, will be empowered in this new era.
 
The 2030 Agenda, and Sustaining Peace
 
Few would argue that the 2030 agenda is not an outstanding achievement, offering tremendous value for truly linking development and peace agendas. Member states (from the North, South, and especially conflict-affected countries) were joined by international organizations and civil society globally to bring about the “peace” priorities and perspectives in the 2030 agenda.
 
In a recent piece I authored on civil society’s role in the 2030 agenda, I describe and reflect on this process.  Of particular relevance to this question of the links with the sustainable peace agenda, I assessed what is needed to ensure that the 2030 agenda is truly transformative – that is – that it will foster sustainable peace within and across societies in ways that ultimately serve to transform the root causes of violence, conflict, and fragility. Three priorities, I suggested as fundamental starting points to ensure this, are: 

1. Address or hold promise of addressing common drivers of conflict and violence on the one hand, and peace and resilience on the other – globally, within and across member states;
2. Offer ongoing pathways for meaningful inclusion of societal actors; and
3. Provide clear implementation and financing mechanisms.

 
I’ll reflect primarily on the more substantive rather than operational aspects of the first two, here, building on my analysis in the aforementioned chapter. The third point is equally, and profoundly important – nothing will materialize without clear implementation and financing mechanisms, and the new Secretary General’s commitment to placing issues of sustaining peace and preventing conflict at the top of his agenda for UN reform and action is a highly welcome starting point.
 
Addressing Drivers
 
On the first point, it will be natural to focus attention on Goal 16 in the 2030 Agenda. Indeed, Goal 16 addresses both internal drivers of violent conflict (lack of access to justice, corruption, unaccountable institutions, exclusive decision making at national and sub-national levels) and external ones (illicit financial and arms flows, organized crime, exclusive global governance). However, other goals and targets are highly relevant for achieving sustainable peace – as reflected by the inclusion of peace in the preamble of the 2030 Agenda connotes. Notably, Goal 10 (on reducing inequalities) and Goal 5 (gender) are highly relevant for transforming structures and institutions, and ultimately shifting power relations at multiple levels—a foundation for achieving genuine, just, and sustainable peace in and across countries. Goals 1 and 2, addressing poverty, food security and agriculture are deeply entwined with ensuring that the basic material conditions required for a decent existence provide a core foundation for peace – long argued, in particular, by African thinkers and policymakers. Additionally, as attention rightly rises on the profound and frightening interconnections between fragility and violent conflict and the environment, and notably, the drivers and impacts of climate change, Goals 12-15 also require a peace lens. Goals dealing with social services and infrastructure too, can and must be addressed in conflict and peace sensitive ways, a fairly well studied but not sufficiently implemented topic.  And the rising attention to cities and sustainable peace is even starting to garner the attention it deserves.

It is also argued that the framework could go further in addressing structural drivers of conflict and fragility – particularly to align with the agenda of sustaining peace and the goal to address root causes. I have heard Global South activists argue that the framework is not sufficiently transformative because it does not fundamentally shift the macro-economic fundamentals and reposition country economies so that they are not so vulnerable to global economic volatility–processes that creates poverty and inequality in the first place. It also does not provide pathways for redistributive justice – i.e. addressing contexts where there are serious disparities of land and resources that fuel conflict. This was also a limitation in the World Bank’s hallmark 2011 WDR on Conflict, Security and Development, that argued the need for focus on investing in citizen security, justice and jobs to reduce violence and strengthen institutions over the long haul.
 
The framework is also suspiciously missing reference to mechanisms to foster reconciliation, conflict resolution and peace-making, and more generally the social and relational side of social cohesion, at all levels within society. During the development of the Agenda, these issues were consistently advocated for by civil society – (as evident in statements informing the Agenda’s development, on www.cspps.org). They were also featured in the New Deal Common Indicators after extensive debate amongst stakeholders. 
 
It is also important to underscore that the peaceful, just and inclusive societies dimension of the 2030 Agenda is much greater than just Goal 16. The framework is clearly unprecedented in bringing together a broad range of structural issues that often underlie or contribute to violent conflict and fragility, alongside and embedded within traditional development objectives, as it puts forth an expansive range of targets (169) covering political, economic and social realms, to affect them. While Goal 16 was by all accounts a magnanimous achievement, it came with some expense to a concerted effort to mainstream a peace and conflict lens throughout the framework. Adopting one central goal can foster a concerning perception that “peace” is associated with primarily security, governance and rule of law activities – which can too easily be dismissed as a Northern/Western agenda. We must continue to draw upon decades of evolutionary thought to ensure it is perceived as an integrated concept, with inclusive development also at its core, and seek to ensure that “peace” in the development framework includes goals and targets throughout, that together encompass the potential for significant change at country and international levels.  In this spirit, the Center for Cooperation at NYU has prepared a useful analysis that makes the case for an integrated approach to peaceful, just and inclusive societies.
 
Pathways for Inclusion
 
The second area concerns the ways in which the framework and its implementation offer ongoing pathways for inclusive participation. The 2030 Agenda addresses these issues in myriad ways, notably, by effectively mainstreaming the concept of inclusivity through many of its goals: education (Goal 4), economic growth and full employment (Goal 8), infrastructure (Goal 9), cities (Goal 11), societies and institutions (Goal 16). By emphasizing participation and inclusion in a range of issues that are often interactive and interdependent, the Agenda addresses power asymmetries, and the exclusionary policies that fuel violence and violent conflict, in a way that most official peacebuilding agreements do not. Central to realizing results in this area will be how the pathways for participation are actively forged, in particular, at national levels, but also globally, with stronger participation of Global South actors. In my chapter I highlight some of the weaknesses of the Agenda 2030 process, notably the much more influential role that northern civil society was able to have in the Agenda’s development, undoubtedly, given that much of the technical and political elements of the process unfolded in New York. 
 
It will be vital that all working for the cause of peace endeavor to “connect the dots” – that is, build meaningful linkages between the inclusion agendas at different levels, towards ensuring that inclusion at one level (i.e. the peace processes, where advances are being made to encourage this both within the UN and by important civic efforts) transmits into other levels, sectors, processes, and notably, results. I make this case in reflecting on the New Deal, how our concerted efforts have sought to understand and promote inclusion not just as a policy goal in terms of process, but in actualizing more inclusive results. Agenda 2030 provides entry points for those working in and on negotiating inclusive peace agreements, to reflect and engage deeply on the pathways for ensuring these issues translate into policy and programmatic results. This of course demands within the United Nations context, that those leading on peace operations – the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) for starters, genuinely come together the United Nations Development Program and other UN agencies to ensure that their strategic frameworks and processes foster meaningful ways to link the political and developmental with national actors at the helm. The challenge – as I’ve argued in numerous places, perhaps first here – is that many of these upstream processes are more heavily managed by the UN, rather than national actors, thus undermining the notion that peacebuilding strategies are and must be nationally led endeavors – which is the priority in national development planning processes (and Agenda 2030), supported by UN agencies and especially UNDP. The goal of truly ensuring national actors are in the drivers’ seat in peacebuilding and development processes requires confronting this tension.
 
Enter the New Deal.
 
Conclusion: The New Deal and the Role of the International Dialogue
 
International Dialogue constituencies were heavily engaged in the shaping of efforts around Goal 16 and wider peace related language in Agenda 2030. While the development of the New Deal predated Agenda 2030 efforts, the global agenda was seen as a North Star, to bring the New Deal inspired concerns and priorities to the highest policy level and to ensure the greatest impact for all. At the same time, the adoption of the 2030 Agenda – lauded by all New Deal constituencies –  presented a challenge: what now is the role for the New Deal? After much deliberation we have made the clear case for the continuing central importance of the New Deal in countries affected by conflict and fragility.

In sum, we argue that the New Deal offers a set of processes and specific instruments that will support selection, prioritisation and implementation of SDGs in ways that create inclusive dialogue around the nature of what they mean in specific contexts, and how they can be implemented and monitored most effectively – and in ways that concertedly support addressing and not aggravating the drivers of conflict and fragility. Not only are these principles representative of good development practice and specifically aligned to fragile and conflict settings, they are also already negotiated and agreed by IDPS stakeholders. Ownership of these principles is strong, and growing, and thus will necessarily support effective realization of the SDGs. Further, the multi-stakeholder International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding represents exactly the kind of partnership envisioned in Agenda 2030’s Goal 17. This partnership can be used and built upon to realize the ambitions of the 2030 Agenda.
 
Most importantly for this reflection at hand on how to bring these two agendas (sustaining peace/conflict prevention and Agenda 2030) together – the New Deal offers practical, concrete experience and deep insight into the how to pursue both agendas in an integrated way. This is precisely what the International Dialogue has been endeavoring – through years of often quite delicate political dialogue – to do. While evaluations on our successes and failures have been undertaken, the key areas of added value in my view for this discussion are three:

• New Deal processes have sought to bring analysis of conflict and fragility to bear, on political decision-making and development planning;

• New Deal instruments have grappled with and continue to grapple with myriad political tensions involved in bringing key actors into dialogue around historical, structural, and fundamentally political challenges in fomenting meaningful change – both in terms of how the international aid architecture works and needs to work and in how governments can and need to more effectively engage their societies in these processes as a starting point;

• New Deal processes have operationally brought societal constituencies (and international constituencies) together in meaningful ways, and catalyzed and institutionalized (in different countries, with varying degrees of success) inclusive processes that link the peacemaking/peacebuilding and development spheres – with a focus on both processes and results. 

​It is the case that these have been attempted and achieved with varying degrees of success. And while the New Deal can be critiqued for this, the efforts in g7+ countries by both governments and civil societies have in many cases been tremendous, and are ongoing. It would be a futile waste of resources and morally debilitating for those who have devoted their time, energy and resources, to not ensure that Agenda 2030 and sustaining peace agenda efforts build upon these efforts in g7+ countries. This can start with a more concerted engagement between actors engaged in these agendas, and it must occur at all levels. While undoubtedly there are political dynamics at play mediating for and against the inclusion and larger voice of different constituencies and actors and substantive concerns – what cannot be debated any longer is that these agendas must be fundamentally driven by national actors. Within the International Dialogue process, g7+ countries (governments and their civil societies) are taking a profound lead in agreeing to, and adopting, a courageous stance and needed actions to move their countries forward in ways that both challenge needed, structural problems in the international aid architecture, and, in ways that have them take ownership of domestic obstacles to meaningful change. This is a process that will take time, that requires ongoing engagement and support of all constituencies and partners.
 
The author thanks Peter van Sluijs and Richard Ponzio for helpful comments.
 
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Erin McCandless teaches in the Graduate Program of International Affairs at The New School in New York, and on behalf of the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, serves as the civil society co-chair of the New Deal Implementation Working Group.
www.erinmccandless.net
Follow Erin on twitter @McCandlessErin