Chapter 2

Civil Society and the 2030 Agenda

Forging a Path to Universal Sustainable Peace through Policy Formulation

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On September 25, 2015, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) formally adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including a set of SDGs aimed at wiping out poverty, fighting inequality, promoting sustainability, building peaceful and inclusive societies, and tackling climate change. The new goals are universal in their application and far broader in vision and intent than their predecessors, the MDGs. Unlike the MDGs' framework, peace-related issues are strongly featured. This achievement came with robust participation of civil society, engaging and interacting in new ways in a more open and inclusive policy formulation context.

In the new framework, peace is named as one of the five areas of critical importance identified in the Preamble, and it is defined in broad and universal terms: "We are determined to foster *peaceful, just and inclusive societies.*" The centerpiece of this approach is Goal 16, to "promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels." A number of other goals and targets—such as Goal 10 on reducing inequalities, and Goal 5 on gender equality and empowerment—ensure that peace is seen as more than an enabler of development but as a core aspirational goal relevant to all countries, not just those considered fragile and conflict-affected.

Several broad currents of research, practice, and policy built a foundation for this shift. Centrally, there was a rising commitment to do development differently in countries affected by conflict and fragility, both to pay far greater attention to context in shaping aid approaches and to respect and foster the need for robust institutions as a starting point for development to take root. Such arguments drove the creation of the IDPS, which forged the "New Deal for Engagement in Conflict-affected and Fragile States" led by members states affected by conflict and fragility who felt that the MDG framework

did not speak to their country's realities and priorities. By the time the SDG process started in 2012, the IDPS initiative had already begun the challenging process of building a deep dialogue among these countries (now organized as the "g7+"),[1] Northern partners, and civil society around what was needed to guide both national and international policies in conflict-affected and fragile states.

Other informative processes included: the increasing awareness of the impact of violence, especially armed violence, for all societies and across all levels of development; the growing acknowledgment of the role of inequality and exclusion, particularly horizontal inequality, as significant contributors to violence, instability and conflict; the growing policy movement to ensure gender equality and empowerment as a key driver of peaceful and prosperous societies; a longtime concern with the role of good governance and increasing awareness of the need for effective institutions, including informal ones; and a strengthening debate about the role of international drivers of injustice and instability, from transnational crime to trade agreements, alongside more inclusive global governance structures and processes to create an international context supportive of national peace and development efforts.

Despite these powerful converging trends, the inclusion of peace issues so prominently within the 2030 Agenda was not a foregone conclusion. Issues relating to violent conflict, good governance, human rights, reconciliation, and rule of law had been notably missing from the MDGs. As discussions began on the SDGs, these issues were not solidly a part of the mainstream development discussion and were little-known to generalist diplomats and government negotiators. Additionally, the topic found resistance from a number of member states, and in some cases from parts of the UN system itself. In short, there was considerable work to do for those keen to see these issues meaningfully included in the framework, and uncertainty remained until the final days of negotiation.

Understanding civil society's role and impact is complicated since the process overall was exceedingly complex, with myriad governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental actors engaging at all levels and in different ways. It can be viewed as an embodiment of the "transnational advocacy network" where actors working internationally on an issue—be they from civil society, international organizations, or governments—are "bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services."[2] In this case however, there were several such transnational networks at play around core issues that eventually fell under a single umbrella to bring peace into the 2030 Agenda. While a broad set of civil society groups was engaged, this analysis centers around peacebuilding-oriented actors, drawing particularly on the experience of peacebuilding CSOs, including think tanks, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from both the Global North and the Global South, NGO coalitions focused on peace issues, academics and their institutions. Many other civil society actors were involved in one or more aspects of this discussion including those focused on issues such as: governance and accountability, justice, human rights, and gender issues; and those with other mandates, such as faith-based organizations.

As part of a project examining civil society's role in building peaceful, just, and inclusive societies, this chapter focuses on civil society efforts to influence and shape policy at the highest levels and to infuse peace concerns into a breathtakingly ambitious global agenda. The analysis focuses on the strategies that civil society employed, reflecting upon how they used their agency to maneuver within the existing power structures and capitalize on entry points to become a serious player in the process. The research draws upon published literature related to civil society and social movements, transformative change, and peacebuilding. It also relies on the unpublished literature produced within civil society during this process and a number of interviews with key informants who were centrally positioned in the process.[3] The analysis is also informed by my own engagement in the process[4] that brings both advantages (insider awareness) and limitations (the bias of my experiences), common for a "participant-observer."

An examination of relevant literature to frame the discussion is followed by a historical narrative of what took place—the "story" of how the process unfolded with the engagement of civil society. Four key questions that have challenged civil society are then examined from different vantage points. In closing, I reflect on how both the processes and outcomes of the 2030 Agenda move us collectively toward the realization of a more universal, sustainable peace.

CONTEXT, STRATEGIES, AND DILEMMAS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ACTION

Strategic choices around how to influence change are shaped by context. Social movement scholars have underscored the importance of the "political opportunity structure," or those features of the political system that create the overall abilities and capacities for civil society groups to organize.[5] At the same time, while context and culture shape civic action, civil society movements are sources of innovation and actions that expand the forms of contention available to succeeding generations of activists.[6] This certainly helps to explain the rise of transnational advocacy networks, in an era of rising global public challenges, and the central role of civil society actors across borders in fueling these networks.

Reflecting on strategies that civil society actors face, it can be helpful to distinguish between process- and substance-oriented choices. In 2011, I described two primary strategy dilemmas that civil society faces in seeking transformative change. The first was whether to prioritize political or economic rights (rights or redistribution). The second was whether and how to work with government and/or donors given their political, economic, and social agendas (participation or resistance).[7]

Issues surrounding the meaning and politics of participation gained traction through civic action in the 1990s and 2000s around relieving or cancelling debt, and participating in international financial institutions (IFIs) and promoting poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) where deep concerns around the quality of participation arose.[8] African scholars have argued that capacity development is often required for people to participate effectively, and that participation of the poor will be futile unless power structures that perpetuate poverty are simultaneously addressed.[9]

Others have suggested that the quality of participation relies on the influence of political context, societal expectations of the process, and the method and organ of participation.[10] Questions of participation are now reappearing in the discourse around *inclusion* and the norm of *inclusivity*. A burgeoning literature and matched policy interest in this area are focused on the need for more inclusive political settlements. A new large comparative study has found that the quality of inclusion matters; when included actors can influence quality of agreements or implementation or push for negotiations, influence is correlated with a higher rate of sustained agreements.[11] Core questions for civil society, however, are whether a critical, autonomous voice can be maintained and efforts to foment structural, transformative change can be sustained when working as partners in processes that are controlled by governments and/or international actors.

Other dilemmas for civil society emerge around substantive issues, especially the framing of policy advocacy. While discourses and priorities will shift over time and undoubtedly play out differently in different contexts, the substantive differences in emphasis by civil society actors always constitute challenges and dilemmas. Additionally, it is clear that there is complex interaction between questions of who participates, who is included and excluded, and what substantive issues are represented on behalf of civil society. These undoubtedly have important impacts on the results.

Assessing the outcomes and impacts of civil society action, particularly at higher-than-project levels, is a complex task with inherent causality challenges. Scholars and practitioners in the peacebuilding field have increasingly turned their attention to how one can understand and strategically influence change that supports peace, in particular "peace writ large," while social movement scholars have discussed questions of what certain actions/tactics

achieved, and what accounts for the "success" of an action.[12] Peace writ large (PWL) is concerned with the "bigger picture" of a conflict, both focusing on terminating violence and supporting a just and sustainable peace by addressing factors that drive conflict.[13]

Understanding how particular outcomes translate into higher-level impacts is widely acknowledged as rife with methodological challenges, especially if linking to contested and normative concepts of transformative change and peace. Social movement literature assumes that public policy outcomes will influence the way the political system as a whole functions. Most agree that translation of grievances into political impact involves structural change,[14] that is, changes *of* rather than changes *in* society.[15]

According to eminent peace theorists (i.e., Curle and Galtung), transformative strategies for peace and change often require the use of confrontational strategies to raise the profile of latent conflict and bring the existence of structural violence into public awareness. Peacebuilding scholars are also conceptualizing the need for vertical integration in peacebuilding, in part to address the challenge of a variety of peacebuilding activities or "peace writ little" (pwl) not adding up to PWL.[16] Vertical integration can be viewed as "a strategy to link actors, ideas and efforts vertically for peacebuilding and development impact."[17] Published studies evaluating civil society or social movement action on peace outcomes at the national level have been few and far between.[18]

Studies attribute success to a variety of factors that concern, among other things, the nature of the strategies employed, who is involved, the diversity and depth of their social base, and the length of time such strategies are sustained.[19] Keck and Sikkink argue that networks are effective in various ways: (1) by framing debates and getting issues on the agenda; (2) by encouraging discursive commitments from states and other policy actors; (3) by causing procedural change at the international and domestic level; (4) by affecting policy; and (5) by influencing behavior changes in target actors.[20] While peacebuilding evaluation importantly raises the importance of factoring considerations of context into evaluation processes to ensure peacebuilding outcomes, social movement theorists link movement success to favorable political opportunities or operating environments.[21]

Both the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the recent reviews of the UN's peacebuilding and peacekeeping work strongly point to a renewed energetic focus on peace sustainability, departing from the more limited and problematic focus, as some scholars argued, on the immediate aftermath of conflict without attention to longer, deeper drivers of peace.[22] Undoubtedly much new attention among scholars and practitioners will be placed on the question of how to achieve sustainable peace. There is no magic solution that can ensure sustainable peace, but there is a growing body of

evidence to suggest that the process must be nationally owned with increasing levels of state and society ownership. Clear and growing processes must be in place to address drivers of conflict and fragility.

FROM OUTSIDE TO MAINSTREAM: CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT IN THE POST-2015 PROCESS

The process leading up to the agreement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in September 2015 was one of the most complex and wide-ranging negotiations the international community has ever attempted. In addition to civil society actors,[23] member states and their intergovernmental bodies were extremely active,[24] as well as a wide array of actors more broadly from within the United Nations system.[25]

At the end of 2011, the UN process began with the formation of the UN Task Team. Some civil society peacebuilding organizations launched discussions on peace and the post-2015 framework in Washington, DC, and New York in the early part of the year. Many of these early discussions drew in actors and issues from the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, which offered a broader framing for development in fragile and conflict-affected environments and had been wrestling with issues of goals applicable to their countries and how to measure them.

The announcement of the leadership of the High Level Panel (HLP) in May 2012 drew further attention, and by the opening weeks of the UNGA session in September 2012 in New York, the issues were gaining traction. One informal peacebuilding civil society network involving CSOs from North and South[26] issued a statement on September 21, the International Day of Peace, entitled "Bringing Peace into the Post-2015 Development Framework." This was followed by a well-attended event (that included representatives of African civil society) on "Mainstreaming Peacebuilding and Prevention in the Post-2015 Agenda" hosted by a group of peacebuilding NGOs. Civil society also participated in the Global Thematic Consultations that launched in the fall of 2012. In Monrovia, Liberia, a meeting hosted by Finland and a number of UN agencies was held on the topic of "Conflict and Fragility and the Post-2015 Development Agenda," bringing together many of the peacebuilding policy CSOs that would be part of the discussion for the next several years, along with many local CSOs.[27]

At this stage, the issues were being moved forward primarily by CSOs with sufficient flexibility in their existing mandates and funding to be able to engage in an emerging policy discussion without extensive preliminary conversations with their donors and constituents. These were mostly established peacebuilding CSOs from the Global North, although the early involvement of regional CSOs such as Igarapé and Africa Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) was important. The participation of focused coalitions such as the Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS) and the Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP) at this stage was also helpful in providing mechanisms for coordination and collaboration, raising general public awareness and enabling the involvement of Southern civil society participants who might not otherwise have been able to engage.

The Rio+20 conference in 2012 established a process for ongoing member state discussion of sustainable development through the Open Working Group (OWG), which met for the first time in March 2013. Other processes underway at the time were eleven global thematic consultations and the deliberations of the HLP. Civil society advocacy efforts over this period were focused on the HLP process and on the thematic consultations. Much of this activity took place beyond New York, involving engagement with the panel members in their home countries or at the global consultations of the panel and the thematic groups. The year also saw peacebuilding CSOs becoming more involved in some of the broader civil society coalitions engaged in the post-2015 process, as well as important convenings on the issues of how to measure progress against peace-related goals and targets, such as the session in Glen Cove in the summer of 2013.[28] In April 2013 a group of New York-based CSOs hosted a full day workshop for senior UN officials entitled "Conflict, Violence, and Instability in the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Workshop for the United Nations System,"[29] which helped establish a broader consensus on the merits of this approach.

The report of the HLP in May 2013 reflected many of these civil society efforts to ensure that peace issues became a core part of the ongoing discussion on the SDGs. Peace and good governance were identified as among five "transformative shifts" and were detailed in two of the preliminary twelve proposed goals (#10 and #11). These goal candidates also included proposed national targets that were manageable in number, well focused and coherent. While the HLP's report was greeted with relief by peacebuilding CSOs, important issues failed to make it into the final document (notably conflict prevention and resolution, as well as reconciliation). This no doubt had much to do with the fact that for many member states, a more traditional development focus was the starting point, with meaningful and legitimate precedents to those of prior official UN processes, such as the Millennium Declaration, the 2015 World Summit Outcome, and the Rio+20 agreement. There was however enough included to form a solid basis for advocacy work.

The epicenter of advocacy shifted to the UN in New York and a series of sessions of the OWG in the General Assembly from March 2013 to July 2014. Peacebuilding CSOs increased their activities around the opening weeks of the General Assembly session in September 2013, putting together

a number of side events and making their voices heard behind the scenes. A highlight was a well-attended event on September 23rd at Scandinavia House on "Stability and Peace: Finding the Heart of Sustainable Development."[30] Civil society engagement with member states increased, particularly among member states of the g7+, but also more influential "emerging powers" that brought different views on how to handle peace and stability. Additionally, the 8th Open Working Group session in February 2014, "Conflict Prevention, Post-conflict Peacebuilding and the Promotion of Durable Peace, Rule of Law and Governance," provided an important space for discussion of peace-related issues.

African member states have a central role in these processes, both in the broader development conversation and as home to the majority of least developed countries (LDCs) and fragile and conflict-affected states. Many non-African countries also follow a strong lead from African countries, including Northern donor countries that are investing in Africa's development. Perhaps the most important impact of the work of African peacebuilding civil society representatives was in advocating for, and supporting, the inclusion of peace issues within the Common African Position on the post-2015 development agenda, finalized in March 2014. This included peace and security as one of six priorities for Africa's development. The establishment of a unified African position came at a critical stage in the OWG negotiation process and was particularly important in shifting the center of gravity of member state views on peace issues, with some who had been negative now moderating their positions.

The final session of the OWG took place in July 2014, with eight days of intense debate culminating in a marathon twenty-nine-hour session. By this time, the governance, rule of law, and security issues had become conflated into one "peace" goal, Goal 16, including a list of ten targets which covered everything from reducing death rates to improving global governance. The survival of Goal 16 was a significant political achievement, albeit at the cost of a meaningful reduction in its coherence. Peacebuilding CSOs remained relieved that their concerns had been taken up by many member states.

The next major milestone was the publication of the Secretary-General's synthesis report in early December 2014, *The Road to Dignity by 2030.* This did not make changes to the OWG's list of goals but added a new framing that stressed the transformative and universal nature of the project, pulled together the current state of thinking on implementation issues, and brought in the findings from some of the technical advisory discussions that had been ongoing in parallel to the OWG sessions.

By early 2015 it was becoming increasingly likely that Goal 16 would be included in the new SDGs, but it was also important to include the new approach of treating peaceful, just, and inclusive societies as a core part of the development agenda in the Preamble and Declaration of the document. These challenges required continuing work with member states. At the same time, discussions on sustainable development targets and indicators were beginning, and the civil society peacebuilding community was keen to ensure that a decade's work of designing and working with peace indicators was included. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), playing a lead role for the UN in this process, put together a Virtual Network of stakeholders for the development of indicators for sustainable development goal 16, which created space for civil society expertise to feed into higher-level UN channels. This became an important clearinghouse for brainstorming and collating input for indicators across Goal 16, bringing together both the justice and the peacebuilding communities.

The critical issue of financing the development goals also came into focus at this time with the July 2015, 3rd International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa. The new agenda needed funding and the financing conversation had been taking place separately from the mainstream of the SDG discussions. It did not reflect the more transformative parts of that agenda—in particular the new emphasis on fostering peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. The release of the States of Fragility 2015 report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) drew attention to the failures of the international system to provide adequate funding for fragile and conflict-affected countries.[31] A small group of CSOs reinforced this messaging in the weeks before Addis Ababa with some focused convening of member state actors.[32]

With concerns on the political front over the inclusion of peace issues in the SDG document—whether they would be reflected in financing decisions, as well as the need to ensure that the peace goal was supported by a strong set of indicators and measures—CSOs remained actively engaged right up to the final meeting of member state negotiators in August 2015. It was here that, after three years of continuous consultation and hard work, 193 governments united behind a shared vision and plan for humanity's future and approved for adoption during the September General Assembly Summit the final SDG outcome document, *Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.*

ISSUES, STRATEGIES, AND DILEMMAS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

The role of civil society as reflected in the post-2015 process now extends beyond shouting and criticizing from the sidelines to critical advocacy and providing pragmatic alternatives. While the former remains important, civil society needs to be well positioned to provide solutions that work when called to. (Showers Matowa)

As the MDGs became the priority of national governments, donors, and international financial institutions, money flowed into MDG-related projects. It was reasonable to assume that the SDG framework would be similarly influential, and the stakes for civil society in the 2030 Agenda were high. Yet, the environment of the post-2015 policy conversation was unique in a number of ways that presented distinct challenges to civil society engagement. The degree of civil society access at the UN headquarters was unprecedented, with a variety of formal and informal routes through which to provide input and engage actively in the discussion. However, the complexity, uncertainty, and constant flux of the underlying processes reduced the effectiveness of many traditional civil society approaches. Ensuring that civil society engagement was itself inclusive, reflecting the perspectives and insights of those impacted by violence and fragility—with Southern as well as Northern voices—was a struggle. Additionally, the fundamental puzzle of how to articulate peace issues most effectively was underlying these processes. These key strategic challenges for civil society are examined in more detail below.

How to Adapt to Unprecedented Access?

The post-2015 process offered greater openness to civil society engagement, more than any previous large UN negotiation. In an environment of this complexity, traditional civil society dilemmas and approaches were not always effective. Issues of whether, for example, to resist the process from the outside given limited access, or to participate in narrow, perhaps compromised and limited ways from the inside, were transcended by this new approach.

A broad range of formal opportunities were available. The major group system had been affirmed at the Rio+20 meeting and continued through the OWG process and the member state negotiating phase that followed, including venues for: NGOs, women, indigenous peoples, children, and youth, among others. These social groups were able to participate in formal hearings and informal meetings to make their views known and provide input into the process. The UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service worked with the office of the president of the General Assembly to develop an approach to civil society participation in major events, such as thematic debates, by soliciting nominations for a selection committee for civil society speakers. The cochairs of the OWG also frequently held hearings for civil society on particular topics, and many of the major processes included opportunities to contribute research and commentary online.

One notable new feature was that many UN agencies had set aside budgets specifically for civil society consultations and engagement to a degree that was new in the UN system. A variety of internet-based platforms were created for outreach and analysis. The *World We Want: Visualizing People's Voice*[33] project reached out directly to get the views of individuals from around the world and was met with an enthusiastic response.

This greater degree of access also created new challenges for civil society engagement. One significant side effect was that the sheer volume of papers, reports, and advocacy pieces was very high. Messaging had to be carefully targeted to the needs of the specific audience, designed to be relevant to the process underway and crafted to be heard. It was not enough to publish a report or advocacy piece: to be noticed required follow-up and direct outreach to decision-makers. This required understanding the dynamics of the process in detail, and an appreciation for the concerns and objectives of the negotiators, as well as for the constraints they faced.

This process was also exceptionally political. It was not enough for civil society to simply produce quality research and set out strong arguments. Technical approaches that worked in Washington, DC, or Brussels were less effective at the UN in New York. These negotiations were taking place against a backdrop of wary relationships between developed and developing countries (as evidenced by the heated discussions over "common but differentiated responsibilities"), deteriorating big-power interactions over peace and security issues (in the Middle East and beyond), and a growing voice from emerging powers. A greater degree of access for civil society required a greater appreciation of the political complexities of the negotiating environment.

Some CSOs were faster to adapt to this new context than others. On occasion the cochairs of the OWG process felt the need to directly request civil society groups to make their contributions more concrete and relevant to the discussions at hand. At the same time, some civil society groups were less able to take advantage of the new openness. CSOs from the Global South were constrained by geography, resources, and capacity (as described below). Those who were able to get funding to come to New York, however, often found they had better access than the larger international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), particularly with developing country delegates. In this context, inside strategies could backfire to the extent that a CSO became associated with a particular political or geographic point of view. For example, Northern CSOs were often viewed by Southern member states and civil society as being in the pocket of Western governments.

How to Navigate the Complexity of the Operating Environment?

From an advocacy perspective, the level of complexity was unprecedented. The SDG process had enormous scope, with consultations taking place all around the world at national, regional, and global levels, revolving around a series of arcane negotiations at the UN in New York. During the four plus

years of the post-2015 process, there was often a considerable lack of clarity around issues such as the next steps in the process or the relevant importance of particular actors, events, and points of entry and engagement. There were also countless, often overlapping meetings that might have potentially been relevant to a particular thread of discussion, but it was unclear which was the most significant.

The process was also very fluid. Negotiating teams in New York were operating in the absence of clear instructions from their capitals on key issues, including those related to the peace agenda. Individual delegations might therefore take their cues from first principles, or from statements made by regional bodies. Member state positions also shifted over time, quite noticeably in some cases, as countries came to more clearly think through which issues within the SDGs concerned them the most. This fluidity was accentuated by the changing dynamics of the negotiating formats themselves. The structure of the OWG process, with small groups of (in some cases unrelated) member states sharing a seat, was quite different from the intergovernmental negotiations that followed. Additionally, although principal groups of actors (member states, UN officials, civil society, etc.) had distinct rights and responsibilities and fields of action, it was possible to see a significant new initiative arise from a member state representative one day or another new initiative arise from a think tank report the next.

The key quality that separated one actor from another was less their formal categorization and more their functional efficacy—their ability to contribute to the discussion and add value in real time. Many links were developed between different types of actors based on practical interdependence; for example, some member state delegations might rely on civil society support and backup, while CSOs might rely on the endorsement of a key UN agency.

In this complex and fluid environment, with low barriers to participation, civil society actors—especially those that were well placed geographically with resources to take advantage of the context—no longer needed to focus so much of their energy on simply getting a seat at the table. An effective civil society strategy now involved developing collaborative partnerships; working in ad hoc coalitions with member states, UN officials, and others based on mutual interests; and sharing information and acting in concert to identify new, jointly owned ways to move the SDG agenda forward.

How to Foster Inclusion and Ownership of Southern Actors and Perspectives?

A core challenge for CSOs, throughout the policy-formation process, was the tension around centrally including and positioning Global South perspectives, especially from conflict-affected countries. This included perspectives

from local, grassroots organizations and addressed the logistical, financial, capacity, and political obstacles of doing so. Inclusion is a core peacebuilding tenet and an evolving international norm. But achieving this in practice in the complex, high-level global policy process centered in New York presented profound challenges.

A small number of Southern regional CSOs were active and able to engage locally, regionally, and internationally, such as Igarapé in Brazil and ACCORD in South Africa. Some partnership organizations (e.g., the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict [GPPAC] and the CSPPS) canvassed their local members and networks, and brought representatives to engage on high-level platforms at different stages in the process.[34] Some INGOs and coalitions were also able to find funding for individuals to participate in policy dialogues in New York and globally, but a sustained and well-resourced engagement from the Global South was not achieved.

Resource constraints were part of the problem. Funding was available for INGOs from their customary donors (typically Northern governments and government agencies), but it was very hard to get new funding for efforts outside those traditional relationships, particularly for Global South organizations who might not have a history of working in global policy centers or a network of contacts among potential grant providers. As one Southern activist shared:

> Northern NGOs tend to be dominant and by far more active, either directly engaging with the process in their own right, or as representing the broader civil society. This is not surprising considering that Northern NGOs tend to be better resourced. There is a perception that with the tightening fiscal space Western donors more and more fund their own civil society to do work in the south as opposed to supporting southern NGOs. There are some concerns about big NGOs speaking for the smaller ones, a difficult dynamic to disentangle given the need for civil society to create a common voice.[35]

There was also a significant difference between organizations that focused on governance and justice issues, who were able to leverage significant new funding for SDG engagement, and peacebuilding organizations, who largely continued to depend upon existing donor relationships. When direct engagement from Global South organizations did occur, it generated good access and opportunities for hearing the concerns of people in the affected regions; an example was the work of the Africa Platform, formerly the Africa CSO Platform on Principled Partnership (ACP).

How to Frame Peace Substantively in the Agenda

Framing and defining the issues central to achieving peace has historically been a widely contested field[36] and there are innumerable lists of what

activities peacebuilding can include.[37] In this case, the challenge was even greater, as the problem was about how to articulate a peace perspective in a universal, aspirational set of broadly based development goals and targets that were designed to be relevant to all societies.

The restrictions of a policy document based on goals and targets required that those engaging in this area make choices as to what they would consider to be the most important issues to address in building sustainable peace. This was contrary to some of the key lessons learned by peacebuilders in recent decades, namely that peacebuilding is context-specific and needs to be approached holistically with a concerted, context-driven strategy, rather than implementation of generic, prioritized lists. Civil society had to think both in terms of what will work *politically*, forging broad acceptance of an overall peace perspective, and technically, articulating evidence-based areas of focus that would lead to sustainable peace in a wide range of different societies.

A core part of this framing already existed. Publications such as the Global Burden of Armed Violence reports[38] and the *World Development Report (WDR) 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* have provided ample evidence for the development community of the harmful impacts of violent conflict.[39] These and other reports demonstrated that the eradication of extreme poverty required attention to the particular needs of fragile and conflict-affected societies. While the WDR proposed strengthening national institutions and improving governance in three priority areas—citizen security, justice, and jobs—Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) focused on: inclusive politics, people's security, access to justice, economic livelihoods, and accountable service delivery.[40] While both approaches provided an existing body of research in support of policy advocacy, they sparked substantive debates over certain concepts.

The concept of state fragility, for example, was not universally accepted, and the category of "fragile and conflict-affected states"—well established among donor countries and the development community—had never been formally taken up by UN member states. Civil society groups noted that the PSGs focused primarily on internal factors (at the national and local levels) and were largely silent on external drivers of instability and violence. Furthermore, they did not speak to issues of equity and inclusion in global governance and decision-making.

Several competing camps of discourse emerged: justice and governance on the one hand, and those rooted in peacebuilding and human security approaches on the other. The first group, led by Western governments and large CSOs such as the Open Society Institute, lobbied for a cluster of issues related to criminal justice, rule of law, accountable and transparent

government, and human rights at a country level. The second group, led by New Deal stakeholders, especially g7+ governments, as well as CSOs involved in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, focused on issues related to peace, freedom from violence, political inclusion and dialogue, human and citizen security, conflict resolution, and social cohesion. There were also historic North-South debates within these camps. For example, for many Northern countries, rule of law is about justice and governance issues within states, whereas for many of the G77,[41] rule of law is about global governance and Security Council reform.[42] The g7+ sought to engage both positions.

Peacebuilding CSOs generally sought to engage with member states by listening, providing platforms for dialogue and reflection, and building bridges between the different perspectives. Many g7+ governments had capable representatives at the UN, but they had limited resources. CSOs provided technical and moral support and bolstered the broader argument by demonstrating that there was solid civil society and research support for the inclusion of peace issues. They also engaged with the emerging powers, such as Brazil and South Africa, who had been largely sidelined in the IDPS/New Deal discussions, yet had firm ideas about the inclusion of peace and stability issues in the SDG process.

The broadening of the approach toward thinking of peace in universal terms occurred over time through the course of member state negotiations and with the strong engagement of civil society actors in New York and other capitals in many parts of the world. The International Dialogue and g7+ countries (Timor-Leste in particular) were pivotal in establishing the political credibility of this agenda, with the listing of "conflict and conflict-affected countries" as a group of states deserving special attention in precursor agreements in the General Assembly. A number of African delegations were successful at including language addressing root causes of conflict in Africa in General Assembly agreements.

CSOs worked diligently to broaden the acceptance of the peace agenda in the SDGs by promoting the acknowledgment that violence was a fundamental dimension of human suffering, as much part of the human experience as poverty and hunger.[43] CSOs also played a key role in ensuring that additional items were included, such as the naming of certain external root causes (such as illicit financial and arms flows) and explicit recognition of the need for more inclusive global governance (important to the emerging powers in particular). The impact of these efforts by states and CSOs was evident in the Secretary-General's synthesis report at the end of 2014, and took its final shape in the Preamble of the 2030 Agenda document that highlighted a determination to "foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies that are free from fear and violence."[44]

ASSESSING OUTCOMES AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE

Given the nature of deeply interactive engagements among many different actors, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions on the role of civil society in these developments. Assessing the impacts of peacebuilding policy-level work is always challenging. Nonetheless, interviews with well-placed sources and from my own experience in the process suggest that civil society played a deeply influential role in key ways. These included:

- providing robust analysis throughout, especially at crucial moments in the process;
- influencing politics at multiple levels and breaking obstacles through persistent negotiations;
- providing influential ideas without needing to take credit;
- lobbying persistently, and at the highest levels;
- supporting the wider inclusion of civil society actors around the world in consultative processes.

This last point is key, for as one CSO representative has suggested, "People are ahead of their leaders, demanding moral leadership and change."[45]

As highlighted above, understanding impact is complicated by many factors. In addition to causality issues common with social science research, the timescale over which changes may be felt can be decades or even generations. For example, the impacts of the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing are still being felt twenty years later, and will continue to be felt for some time to come. The impact is not just in the implementation of a particular agreement, but must be viewed through all the other international, regional, and national agreements and policies that it affects. Like ripples in a lake, the effects of a major change in international norms and standards can be felt in myriad ways in shifts in policies, standards, attitudes, and actions across the world.

The challenges are very clear in the case of the peaceful, just, and inclusive societies dimension of the 2030 Agenda. The broad scope of the SDG agreement encompasses a wide range of issues that are often cited as being among the root causes of conflict. This breadth provides a stage for the articulation of a comprehensive vision of peaceful societies and takes critical steps in addressing issues that lay a foundation for sustainable peace, across societies and universally, that is in many ways unprecedented in its compass.

The outcomes of the combined efforts of different actors to infuse peace within the post-2015 framework include the following:

- Policy directly referencing peace and how to achieve it in place at the highest level, to be applied universally;
- Mainstreaming discussions of peace in development thinking and practice;
- Exposing large numbers of diplomats, other policymakers, and influencers to the broader ideas of peacebuilding;
- Setting a precedent for more inclusive policymaking, including better pathways for the involvement of civil society;
- Providing a framework for greater participation and inclusion of civil societies in the SDG framework and its implementation; and,
- Setting a precedent for coordination among peacebuilding policy organizations to support a major policy achievement.

Building upon these outcomes and the critical insights of literature and practice, the following three priorities are suggested as fundamental starting points to support the transformative efforts required to bring about sustainable peace within *and across* societies:

1. Address or hold promise of addressing common drivers of conflict and violence on the one hand, and peace and resilience on the other—globally, within, and across member states;
2. Offer ongoing pathways for meaningful inclusion of societal actors; and
3. Provide clear implementation and financing mechanisms.

Regarding the first point, the peaceful, just, and inclusive societies dimension of the 2030 Agenda is much greater than just Goal 16. It is a package, including several goals and targets that together encompass the potential for significant change at national and international levels. It is unprecedented in the way it brings together a broad range of structural issues that often underlie or contribute to violent conflict and fragility, alongside and embedded within traditional development objectives, and in the way it puts forth an expansive range of targets (169) covering political, economic, and social realms, to affect them.

Goal 16 addresses both internal drivers of violent conflict (lack of access to justice, corruption, unaccountable institutions, exclusive decision-making at national and subnational levels) and external ones (illicit financial and arms flows, organized crime, exclusive global governance). Other goals and targets, including Goal 10 (on reducing inequalities), and Goal 2 (gender), are also highly relevant for transforming structures and institutions, and ultimately shifting power relations at multiple levels—a foundation for achieving genuine, just, and sustainable peace.

At the same time, some argue that the framework could go further in addressing structural drivers of conflict and fragility. On the economic side,

as one Indian government representative suggested, the framework "is a floor, not a ceiling," because substantive drivers of injustice issues are not addressed.[46] Some Global South activists argue that the framework is not sufficiently transformative because it does not fundamentally shift the macroeconomic framework and reposition country economies so that they are not so vulnerable to global economic volatility–processes that create poverty and inequality in the first place.[47] Neither does it provide pathways for addressing contexts where there are serious disparities of land and resources that fuel conflict. These are important issues for ongoing attention and debate, both at national and international levels. The critiques are driven by the experience of scholars, policymakers, and activists across the Global South, who have been at the receiving end of global frameworks and internationally prescribed policies that have often resulted in adverse effects within their countries.

Crucially, the framework is weak on mechanisms to foster reconciliation, conflict resolution, peacemaking, and more generally the social and relational side of social cohesion, at all levels within society. This was consistently advocated by civil society, and featured in the New Deal Common Indicators.[48] While Goal 16 was by all accounts a magnanimous achievement, it came with some expense at a concerted effort to mainstream a peace and conflict "lens" throughout the framework. Some efforts were made in this regard,[49] but ultimately this agenda lost ground to the wider push for one inclusive goal. The other fallout of this goal is a concerning perception that "peace" is associated with primarily security, governance, and rule-of-law activities, despite decades of evolutionary thought to ensure it is perceived as an integrated concept, with development also at its core.[50]

The second area concerns the ways in which the framework and its implementation offer ongoing pathways for inclusive participation. This is crucial for addressing power asymmetries and exclusionary policies that fuel violence and violent conflict. The substantive content of the 2030 Agenda addresses these issues in myriad ways, notably by effectively mainstreaming the concept of inclusivity through many of its goals: education (Goal 4), economic growth and full employment (Goal 8), infrastructure (Goal 9), cities (Goal 11), and societies and institutions (Goal 16). By emphasizing participation and inclusion in a range of issues that are often interactive and interdependent, the 2030 Agenda addresses power asymmetries in a way that most official peacebuilding agreements do not. Central to realizing results in this area will be how the pathways for participation are actively forged, in particular at national levels.

The third area is focused on implementation, and the financing needed to ensure this. While it is still too early to assess the provision of clear implementation and financing mechanisms, civil society has expressed concerns. To date, despite the space created for civil society in forging the 2030 Agenda, governments are in the driver's seat on almost all discussions around implementation, measurement and review processes, and financing. The discussions are being forged within narrow, high-level spaces with limited engagement for meaningful civil society participation.

On each of these areas the New Deal, its processes, and instruments can and should be engaged. The three New Deal constituencies are committed to this after years of investment in forging this international social compact. Civil society is playing a leadership role in thinking through how to guarantee alignment across the two frameworks to ensure that (1) the New Deal processes support conflict-affected states to work toward and strengthen the 2030 Agenda outcomes, supporting prioritization and the shaping, relevance, and building of ownership of the goals in relevant countries; and (2) the SDGs support New Deal implementation—the overarching goal of the three IDPS constituencies in the New Deal process.

Saferworld argues that 17 goals and 169 targets "risk making implementation so challenging that the agenda is either very selectively implemented or, worse, quietly ignored by decision-makers who already feel over-burdened." Further, it suggests, many of the global targets are not quantified, which will make it difficult to ascertain whether they have been achieved by 2030. Nor is there a commitment by member states to set quantified benchmarks for success at a national level. This will also make it harder to hold leaders accountable. None of this is helped by an agreement on a weak follow-up and review process.[51]

Building upon many of the insights that have come through the New Deal process, Saferworld argues that meaningful implementation will involve identifying national indicators for the SDG targets and collecting data to track and uphold the ambitions set out in Goal 16. In addition, as priorities to fit each context are defined, inclusive consultations at the national level need to be held in order to put people's needs at the forefront of development. Global processes will also need to be leveraged to enable and support national-level action and to address transnational drivers of conflict such as illicit financial flows and strengthening nonofficial and official data collection capacities.[52]

In the final analysis, the success of the 2030 Agenda will be measured not only in the specific implementation of the goals, but by its impacts. The quality and degree to which it will be implemented will depend upon how successor agreements, standards, and practices engage and build upon and support the implementation of these goals and targets. Crucially, a transformative impact relies upon the uptake by national governments, and how they align their national policies and practices.

CONCLUSIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP AND ACTION

The 2030 agenda is one of the most progressive international agreements to date and offers promising entry points for civil society participation in advancing development and peace. The atmosphere at the time of its adoption in 2015 was celebratory. Peacebuilding advocates and their allies, among member states and UN officials, congratulated each other in getting peace issues onto the negotiating table and keeping them there through years of sustained effort. This was a significant achievement, although only time will tell if the SDG goals and targets force a rethink of policy at national and global levels and whether they create space for bringing about requisite structural changes.

The following lessons highlight takeaways from the role of civil society in forging the 2030 Agenda. First, as scholars have long argued, it continues to be vital to understanding the context within which civil society engagement occurs. The context here—and one that will no doubt continue—is complex, dynamic, chaotic, and rapidly changing but also accessible to civil society engagement. CSOs are compelled to play new types of roles that involve much more direct collaboration with governmental and intergovernmental actors to achieve results. Scholars can further reflect upon these issues, and how these new contexts affect civil society strategizing, dilemmas, and impact.

This context of complexity and direct engagement creates challenges to traditional ways of organizing. A special concern is ensuring that Global South actors are meaningfully included in the process. Many new entry points and opportunities exist for civil society engagement, but civil society actors need to think carefully about how to take advantage of these openings to bring meaningful results for all. Deeper reflection is also needed on how to conceptualize and capitalize on the phenomena of transnational advocacy networks in ways that are transformative and build inclusion. In this context, maintaining a focus on peace issues within a development framework is vital, as they can easily get drowned out in a movement to infuse SDGs in national development frameworks. Further, we need to better understand how the diffusion of actors across multiple issue networks can be meaningfully managed in interactive ways to ensure that the implementation of the SDG agenda truly addresses the root causes of conflict and fragility, engages national capacities of resilience, and brings transformative results. Utilizing the New Deal framework in IDPS countries can support this, notably, by ensuring that country-driven analysis of what drives conflict and fragility is engaged, and the commitment to political dialogue that engages national actors remains central to informing how the prioritization and sequencing of SDG implementation is undertaken.

Steadfast attention by peacebuilding-oriented CSOs is particularly needed to ensure that international attention is maintained on core priorities likely to guarantee the success of the sustainable peace agenda in the three areas discussed above, around: (1) addressing common drivers of conflict and violence and building support for the conditions of peace globally and within and across member states; (2) forging pathways for meaningful inclusion of societal actors in all aspects of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda; and (3) working for the implementation and financing of this agenda.

By targeting the UN, civil society actors can impact global norms and standards and influence the way the international community prevents and responds to outbreaks of violence. At the same time, because the UN is a body of member states, it remains necessary to target these member states and national institutions in support of the development-as-peace agenda. Most importantly, civil society must ensure ever-stronger attention and action to deepen its engagement with people at all levels, in all countries. This is what will pivotally guarantee that this universal project fosters a people-driven and owned agenda for sustainable peace.

NOTES

1. Which now include: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, and Yemen.

2. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, "Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics," *International Social Science Journal* 51, no. 159 (1999): 89.

3. A key contributor to this article in laying out the detailed story of civil society participation, with deep insider knowledge of the process at the UN headquarters in New York, is Andrew Tomlinson, director of the Quaker UN Office. Other key informants interviewed: Paul Okumu, Rob Muggah, Showers Mawowa, and Henk-Jan Brinkman.

4. Erin McCandless participated in the 2030 Agenda process on behalf of civil society engaged in the New Deal process, through the Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS), while she served as a representative to the Executive Committee of this body.

5. Anders Uhlin, "The Transnational Dimension of Civil Society: Migration and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia," in *Civil Society and Authoritarianism in the Third World*, eds., B. Beckman, E. Hansson and A. Sjögren (Stockholm: PODSU, Stockholm University, 2001).

6. Doug McAdam and David Snow, eds., *Social Movements: Reader on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics* (Los Angeles: Roxbury, 1997).

7. The first dilemma concerns whether a rights-based approach, often assumed by many in the Global South to be associated with civil and political rights and individual liberties or an approach, focused on the redistribution of wealth, land, and other natural resources, will more readily achieve the desired change. In the second dilemma, participation refers to the strategy of partnering with, or working within, processes set up by government or donors, and resistance to the strategy of fomenting change by working outside the system, challenging and transforming existing structures of authority or processes that visibly reinforce the status quo, or creating entirely new, parallel structures and processes. The former reflects contemporary discourse and evolving practices around the nature of civil society relations with the state and international donors in particular, while the latter—often used in leftist, nationalist, and social movement discourse and practice—implies radical, and even confrontational strategies and anticipated radical outcomes, that is, structural, transformative change. These were developed as heuristic devices to understand Zimbabwe's polarization, but are argued to have much wider relevance for civic actors. Erin McCandless, *Polarization and Transformation in Zimbabwe: Social Movements, Strategy Dilemmas and Change* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2011).

8. McCandless, *Polarization and Transformation in Zimbabwe*.

9. The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development suggests that people must be empowered to effectively participate (Arusha 1990). Gumah argues that empowerment means the provision of space and institutional frameworks for consensus building, and equipping people with the requisite knowledge and skills to participate effectively and meaningfully in the national policy dialogue process. Awudu Ahmed Gumah, "Prospects for Poverty Reduction in Ghana: A Critical Analysis of the PRSP Process and Outcomes" (Harare: *AFRODAD PRSP Series*, 2003).

10. Genevieve Painter, *Quality Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategies: Experiences from Malawi, Bolivia, and Rwanda* (London: Eurodad, 2002).

11. Thania Paffenholz, "Results on Women and Gender from the 'Broader Participation' and 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding' Projects," Briefing Paper, Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding Geneva: The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2015, http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ccdp/shared/Docs/Publications/briefingpaperwomen%20gender.pdf.

12. See, for example, McAdam and Snow, *Social Movements*, 461 for insights into social movements and http://dmeforpeace.org/ to gain insight into the peacebuilding evaluation community of practice.

13. Mary B. Anderson and Lara Olson, *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners* (Cambridge, MA: CDA, 2003).

14. Björn Beckman, Eva Hannson, and Anders Sjögren, eds., *Civil Society and Authoritarianism in the Third World: A Conference Book* (Stockholm: Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, 2001).

15. Piotr Sztompka, *The Sociology of Social Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

16. Anita Ernstorfer, Diana Chigas, and Hannah Vaughan-Lee, "From Little to Large: When Does Peacebuilding Add Up?" in "Vertical Integration in Peacebuilding," special issue, *Journal for Peacebuilding and Development* 10, no. 1 (2015).

17. Erin McCandless, Tim Donais, and Eric Abitbol, "Vertical Integration: A Dynamic Practice Promoting Transformative Peacebuilding," in "Vertical Integration in Peacebuilding," special issue, *Journal for Peacebuilding and Development* 10, no. 1 (2015): 1–9.

18. Collaborative for Development Action's (CDA's) Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) program has delved into this area for over a decade, while McCandless has developed a framework for evaluating social movement impacts on transformative change and peace at the national level. Refer to McCandless, *Polarization and Transformation in Zimbabwe*.

19. For example, refer to Doug McAdam, "Freedom Summer Project, Mississippi, 1964," in *Protest, Power, and Change: An Encyclopedia of Nonviolent Action from ACT-UP to Women's Suffrage*, eds., Roger S. Powers and William B. Voegele (New York: Garland Publishing, 1997), 192–194; and Lloyd M. Sachikonye, "Civil Society, Social Movements, and Democracy in Southern Africa," *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research* 8, no. 4 (1995): 399–411.

20. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, "Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics," 201.

21. See for example, Jack A. Goldstone, "Introduction: Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics," in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, ed., Jack A. Goldstone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 20. Some also elevate explanations based on resource mobilization or collective action over the role of political context; for example, see William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, 2nd edn. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1990).

22. Erin McCandless, "In Pursuit of Peacebuilding for Perpetual Peace: Where the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture Needs to Go," Working Paper for the Future of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project, Center for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010, http://www.cips-cepi.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/McCandless.pdf.

23. The Major Group process alone identifies nine sectors (from business to local authorities and women). Traditional NGOs (North, Global South, large and small, policy and grassroots, and multi- and single-mandate) were all present, but academics and think tanks and the media all had key roles. Coalitions of civil society groups were also notable for their important role in this discussion.

24. These included national government ministries and departments, UN mission diplomats, and national negotiating teams. Governments also acted through regional organizations, such as the African Union, and through UN-based voting blocks, such as the "G77" (nonaligned nations) or the "LDCs," and through the General Assembly, United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the Security Council, as well as the governing boards of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs).

25. Including actors from all programmatic departments of the secretariat and most of the agencies, funds, and programs, including voices both from headquarters and the field. Also, officials from the World Bank and other international institutions.

26. "Bringing Peace into the Post-2015 Development Framework: A Joint Statement by Civil Society Organizations," September 2012, http://www.cspps.org/

documents/130616042/130626578/2012_09_28_CSO_Joint_Statement_Post-2015_ENG.pdf/a187d69f-3a87-46b1-82d1-90e24768424d.

27. International NGOs participating included ACCORD, Igarapé, the Institute for Economics and Peace, International Alert, Saferworld, and the Quaker UN Office, along with academics and think tanks such as the NYU Center on International Cooperation.

28. UNICEF, PBSO, UNDP, *Report of the Expert Meeting on an Accountability Framework for Conflict, Violence, Governance and Disaster in the Post-2015 Development Agenda* (Glen Cove, NY: June 18–19, 2013).

29. International Peace Institute, "Conflict, Violence, and Instability in the Post-2015 Development Agenda," Meeting Note, October 2013, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_post_2015.pdf.

30. Quaker United Nations Office, "QUNO Co-Hosts a High Level Side Event in the Opening Week of the 68th General Assembly on Stability and Peace," September 2013, http://quno.org/timeline/2013/9/quno-co-hosts-high-level-side-event-opening-week-68th-general-assembly-stability-and.

31. OECD-DAC, *States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions*, Revised edition (Paris: OECD, 2015), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/development/states-of-fragility-2015_9789264227699-en#page1.

32. QUNO, "Funding for Peace: Lessons Learned," Meeting Note, June 2015, http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/quno_cic_ffd_meeting_note_final_june_2_2015.pdf.

33. The World We Want, "Visualizing People's Voices," http://millionvoices-data.worldwewant2015.org/

34. Rob Muggah of Igarapé, interview with author, January 2016.

35. Showers Matowa of SAPES, interview with author, December 2015.

36. The Alliance for Peacebuilding lists many of them: http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/2013/08/selected-definitions-of-peacebuilding/.

37. United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, "What is Peacebuilding?" http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/what-is-peacebuilding/.

38. Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Keith Krause, and Matthias Nowak, eds., *The Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey of Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, 2015).

39. World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0,,contentMDK:23256432~pagePK:478093~piPK:477627~theSitePK:477624,00.html.

40. International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, "New Deal Principles," published online, http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/new-deal/new-deal-principles/.

41. The G77, an intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the UN, was established in 1964 to articulate and promote their collective economic interests.

42. Rob Muggah, interview with author, December 2015.

43. For example, the statement by the Quaker UN Office at the 8th session of the OWG makes this point clearly. Refer to QUNO, "QUNO Participated in Open Working Group 8

on the Sustainable Development Goals," March 2014, http://quno.org/timeline/2014/3/quno-participated-open-working-group-8-sustainable-development-goals.

44. United Nations, *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (New York: UN, 2015), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E.

45. Peter van Tuijl, statement during "Strengthening Peacebuilding Policy through Civil Society Empowerment" conference, University of Notre Dame, October 25–27, 2015.

46. Remarks during the "Delivering on the Promise of Goal 16" event during the UN General Assembly debate, September 24, 2015.

47. Patrick Bond, interview with author, October 2015.

48. IDPS, "Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Indicators: Progress, Interim List and Next Steps" (IDPS Global Meeting, Washington, DC, April 19, 2013).

49. CSPPS brought analysis to bear, building upon its years of central participation in the New Deal process developing the PSGs, targets, and indicators; see: "Putting Sustainable Peace and Safe Societies at the Heart of the Development Agenda: Priorities for Post-2015," CSPPS and QUNO, September 2013, http://tinyurl.com/j2l86ar.

50. Erin McCandless, "Wicked Problems in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding: Making Progress in Measuring Progress in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding," *Global Governance* 19, no. 2 (2013): 227–248.

51. Thomas Wheeler, "Peace Finds Its Place at the Heart of the New Global Development Framework," Saferworld, August 3, 2015, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/comment/182-peace-finds-its-place-at-the-heart-of-the-new-global-development-framework.

52. Ibid.